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EXILE ON MAIN STREET: COMPETING
TRADITIONS AND DUE PROCESS
DISSENT
COLIN STARGER*
Everybody loves great dissents. Professors teach them, students learn
from them, and journalists quote them. Yet legal scholars have long
puzzled over how dissents actually impact the development of doctrine.
Recent work by notable empirical scholars proposes to measure the
influence of dissents by reference to their subsequent citation in case law.
This Article challenges the theoretical basis for this empirical approach
and argues that it fails to account for the profound influence that uncited
dissents have exerted in law. To overcome this gap in the empirical
approach, this Article proposes an alternative method that permits
analysis of contextual and inter-textual aspects of doctrinal development.
This method proceeds by dividing doctrinal territories into rival schools
of thought and then constructing opinion genealogies for each competing
school.
Connections between opinions—majority, concurring, and
dissenting—are justified using both citation and more nuanced
hermeneutic analyses. Through systematic tracking of debate between
rival schools over generations, the impact of dissents is revealed in the
turns taken during unfolding doctrinal argument.
Using this method, this Article examines two key Due Process
territories—economic liberty and “incorporation”—and demonstrates
how uncited Supreme Court dissents dramatically changed the course of
these doctrines. First, it is demonstrated that uncited dissents by Joseph
Bradley in the Slaughter-House Cases and by Oliver Wendell Holmes in
Lochner v. New York directly contributed to the well-known rise and fall
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; NYU Law School,
2007–2010. J.D., Columbia Law School, 2002. This Article was produced with the support of
a University of Baltimore Summer Research Fellowship. The opinion maps in this Article
were rendered using custom software implementing the author’s information design. I am
profoundly grateful to Darren Kumusawa, who created the software architecture and worked
tirelessly on its implementation. Thanks also to C.J. Peters, Garrett Epps, Brandon Garrett,
Jennifer Laurin, Peter Markowitz, Dave Jaros, Chris Fabricant, and participants in the NYU
Lawyering Colloquium for their generous insight and critique on prior drafts. Of course,
errors herein are entirely mine.
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of economic liberty. Second, the momentous battle over incorporation is
proven to have dramatically turned under the influence of uncited dissents
by John Marshall Harlan in Hurtado v. California and Hugo Black in
Adamson v. California. The incorporation story features analysis of
John Paul Stevens’ final, passionate dissent after thirty-five years on the
Court, which came in the 2010 blockbuster Second Amendment
incorporation case, McDonald v. City of Chicago.
Apparent
contradictions in this critical opinion are resolved by connecting Stevens’
dissent to the tradition of uncited great dissents that forever changed
substantive due process doctrine.
To illustrate the results of its method, this Article introduces an
innovative series of “opinion maps” that graphically represent the
competing due process genealogies in economic liberty and incorporation
doctrine. Rendered using custom software designed by the author, the
opinion maps present information-rich, epic-scale historical portraits of
these key constitutional doctrines. The maps have practical and
theoretical use. Practically, they offer accessible guides to the place of and
relationships between major opinions in two crucial substantive due
process debates. Theoretically, the figures rendered collectively suggest
deep metaphors for the interpretative space we call doctrine and for the
vital role dissents play in drawing lines of authority that define the shape
and boundaries of this interpretative space.
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1255
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I. INTRODUCTION
I wish a lawyer would measure the development of law by
dissents,—which are worth more study than is usually accorded
them. In a court not subject to sudden change, able and continued
dissent delimits and accentuates decision; it reveals far more than
does the majority opinion the intellectual differences of the
council table; and the present status of police power is to me more
clearly revealed by the dissents of Justice Holmes than by the
syllabi of digests.
Judge Charles Merrill Hough1
When Judge Hough made these remarks in an annual lecture at
Cornell University in the spring of 1918, Oliver Wendell Holmes’ now
celebrated Lochner v. New York dissent—decrying the Court’s striking
down of maximum-hours legislation for bakers in New York—had been
2
on the books for thirteen years. Despite this passage of time, Judge
Hough emphasized Justice Holmes’ contemporary influence over due
process debates and liberally quoted aphorisms from his Lochner
3
dissent. Hough’s enthusiasm is understandable. By 1918, Holmes’
dissents appeared to have persuaded some justices seated at the council
table to change course. Just one year prior to Hough’s lecture, the
Court had handed down Bunting v. Oregon, which upheld against a due
4
process challenge maximum-hours legislation regulating millers. This
result flatly contradicted Lochner’s vision of due process protecting
individual economic liberty and appeared to embrace a Holmesean
jurisprudence authorizing health and welfare regulations as legitimate
exercises of police power.

1. Charles M. Hough, Due Process of Law—To-day, 32 HARV. L. REV. 218, 231 (1919).
2. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In this
Article, I introduce Supreme Court justices by their first names. Since Supreme Court
opinions do not specify Christian names, I have located this information using the remarkable
A Visual History of the Supreme Court of the United States, published by Timeplots
[hereinafter SCOTUS VISUAL HISTORY]. For a fully searchable electronic version of this
document, see A VISUAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
(2010), http://timeplots.com/scotus/.
3. See Hough, supra note 1, at 232 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)). Among Holmes’ now legendary aphorisms cited by Hough were “a ‘constitution
is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,’” and “the ‘Fourteenth Amendment
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s social statics.’” Id.
4. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
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Yet this happy tale of a righteous dissent’s redemption is deceptive.
Although Holmes’ view did eventually prevail, charting the actual path
of triumph reveals the difficulty inherent in any Houghian project
5
aspiring to “measure the development of law by dissents.” Consider
the approach of notable empirical scholars who advocate measuring the
influence of dissents over doctrine by reference to their subsequent
6
citation. An exclusively citation-based approach would apparently
conclude that Holmes’ dissent played no role in Lochner’s famous and
7
definitive overruling by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish in 1937. This is
because Holmes’ Lochner dissent was cited exactly zero times in the
West Coast Hotel majority opinion and zero times in the authorities
8
relied upon by the majority. However, I regard this absence of citation
more as evidence of a methodological limitation in this empirical
approach than as proof that Holmes’ dissent failed to contribute to the
demise of Lochnerism. Despite the absence of citation, a direct line
unquestionably connects the West Coast Hotel majority opinion to
Holmes’ Lochner dissent twenty-two years earlier. The trick is figuring
out just how to draw this line.
In this Article, I attempt to measure how dissents shape the
development of doctrine while attending to vexing line-drawing
problems like connecting Holmes’ dissent to the ultimate repudiation of
Lochner. My specific focus is on dissents in the realm of due process,
and my approach draws on a hermeneutic understanding of the
9
interplay between text and tradition. I posit Supreme Court opinions—
5. Hough, supra note 1, at 231.
6. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When)
Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 17 (U. Chi. L. Sch., John M. Olin Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 510 (2d series), Jan. 2010) (citing James H. Fowler et al., Network
Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme
Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324 (2007)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542834 (“We
assume that the more citations to an opinion, the greater its influence is likely to be in shaping
the law . . . .”).
7. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v.
Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)). Although West Coast Hotel only explicitly overruled
Adkins, the Court has recognized that “West Coast Hotel . . . signaled the demise of Lochner
by overruling Adkins.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992)
(internal citations omitted).
8. Holmes’ dissent was not cited in a Supreme Court opinion until a 1948 free speech
case. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 527 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“If ‘the
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,’ neither does it
enact the psychological dogmas of the Spencerian era.” (internal citations omitted)).
9. Hermeneutics refers to the theory and practice of interpretation, particularly the
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majority, concurring, or dissenting—as specific textual instantiations of
competing traditions within due process doctrine. These competing
traditions express and advance the teachings of rival schools of thought
regarding the constitutional meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. I argue that dissents can keep particular
traditions of constitutional interpretation alive when forced into exile by
shifting majorities on the Court.
My argument finds visual representation through a series of
“opinion maps” that trace lineages of certain antagonistic schools of due
10
process tradition. Figure 1 below demonstrates the concept behind the
opinion map by charting our introductory example. It presents Holmes’
Lochner dissent as one opinion point in a bloodline that extends from
11
Justice Samuel Miller’s majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases
all the way forward to Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes’ majority
opinion in West Coast Hotel. Each triangle represents an opinion; the
case name appears above the opinion and the opinion author appears
below. The map’s X-axis shows the year an opinion issued while the Yaxis supplies the number of votes cast in support of the opinion—all
points above the dashed line are thus majority opinions. Solid arrows
joining opinions indicate that the latter opinion directly cited the earlier
one. Dotted arrows indicate a hermeneutic connection that I argue
exists in tradition notwithstanding the absence of formal citation.

interpretation of texts. Originally concerned with the interpretation of ancient and sacred
texts in light of classical and religious tradition, hermeneutics now extends well beyond its
original theological and legal confines to embrace larger philosophical problems of
understanding and meaning. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD
(Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 2004) (seminal work on
philosophical hermeneutics). The legal academy has an established tradition of viewing
jurisprudence and doctrine through a hermeneutic lens. See, e.g., Brian Bix, H.L.A. Hart and
the Hermeneutic Turn in Legal Theory, 52 SMU L. REV. 167 (1999). For an excellent recent
collection of law review articles concerning hermeneutics, see GADAMER AND LAW (Francis
J. Mootz III ed., 2007).
10. The remaining Figures in the text of the article are in black and white. The
Appendix contains color images of all Figures save for Figure 4.1.
11. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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Figure 1.

The genealogical metaphor suggested by the maps in this Article
echoes the familiar practice of referring to “lines” of cases or to a
leading case “and its progeny.” However, I refine the usual metaphor
by mapping the relationships between opinions rather than between
cases. Opinions have authors, which unlike faceless attribution to “the
Court,” directly imply personal agency and the ideological commitments
of individuals. Opinions in these maps are represented as triangles that
either point up or down. All of the triangles in Figure 1 thus point down
since the opinions in this line did not find an economic right (or, if
12
written in dissent, would not have found an economic right).
12. Conversely, the triangles in Figure 2—representing the competing tradition
supporting economic liberty—all point up because they represent opinions favoring the
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Although I critique empiricists’ over-reliance on citation as a means
of measuring a dissent’s influence, I recognize the primacy of direct
citation in establishing connections between lines of opinions. As Figure
1 demonstrates, my method leans heavily on solid arrows—indicating
direct citation—to establish essential links between opinions such as
Slaughter-House and Holden, or Holden and Holmes’ dissent in
Lochner. However, I also argue that citation is not the only way to
“connect the dots” when measuring a dissent’s influence. I thus draw
dotted arrows between opinions that are hermeneutically connected
despite the absence of formal citation. I call these connections
hermeneutic because they require interpretation of surrounding
doctrinal context and tradition. Figure 1 thus posits that Holmes’
Lochner dissent was relied upon, but not cited by, the majority in
13
Bunting and the dissents in Adkins.
My original theoretical claim is that dissents can profoundly affect
the development of doctrinal tradition without ever being cited. To
prove this claim, I examine two specific areas of due process doctrine—
economic liberty and “incorporation”—where uncited dissents exercised
profound influence over doctrinal development. Though uncited, these
dissents did not go unread. Dissents provided context for majority text.
The first four featured dissents in this Article—by Oliver Wendell
14
15
Holmes in Lochner, Joseph Bradley in the Slaughter-House Cases,
16
Hugo Black in Adamson v. California, and John Marshall Harlan in
17
Hurtado v. California —all provided alternate readings of authority that
ultimately changed the course of substantive due process doctrine. The
last dissent featured—also the final dissent by John Paul Stevens after
18
thirty-five years on the Court, in McDonald v. City of Chicago —seeks
to replicate the remarkable success of such great dissents in steering
substantive due process. Exiled on the main street of Supreme Court
existence of economic due process rights. See Fig.2, infra p.1273.
13. Proof of this proposition is offered below. See infra Part II.A.
14. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
15. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 111–24 (Bradley, J., dissenting). See
infra Part II.B.
16. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68–92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). See infra
Part III.A.
17. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538–58 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See infra
Part III.B.
18. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3088 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See infra Part III.C.
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reporters, great dissents create interpretative spaces for future
generations. The opinion maps rendered in this Article suggest a visual
metaphor for these interpretative spaces and for the competing lines of
opinions charting paths through them.
My methodological contribution is a new technique for studying
doctrinal development. This technique fills a gap in the empirical
approach that fails to account for the profoundly inter-textual nature of
19
doctrine and consequently overlooks the influence of uncited dissents.
My technique derives from a traditional understanding of doctrine as
territory usefully divided into competing schools of thought. By
constructing opinion genealogies and carefully recording the votes
secured by each opinion, I suggest a systematic way to track the
changing fortunes of rival schools. By tracing debates between
competing schools over generations, I conceptualize doctrinal evolution
as an unfolding argument. Dissents define the boundaries of the debate;
they push and pull the argument in new directions. To measure the
development of law by dissents is to note precisely when and how the
argument turned because of dissent. This demands close reading of
opinion texts and a hermeneutic method that is more multi-layered and
less mechanical than empirical techniques. Ultimately though, this
method is equally rigorous and analytical, and facilitates deeper insight
into the text and context of discrete doctrinal territories.
Using this method, I conduct thorough inquiries into two vital areas
of substantive due process doctrine—economic liberty and
incorporation. The genealogies produced and mapped offer epic-scale
historical portraits of the development of these key constitutional
doctrines. In addition to contributing to substantive due process
scholarship, the portraits also enrich understanding of the history of
dissent. Legal scholars have previously observed that Supreme Court
dissents were rare from the time Chief Justice John Marshall introduced
20
the “opinion of the Court” in 1801 up until the 1930s–1940s. They have
described this early period as embracing a “norm of consensus” and
21
have hotly debated the precise cause of the norm’s demise and its
19. The critique of the empirical approach is developed in Part II infra.
20. See Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence
Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 20 (2008) (citing Robert Post, The Supreme Court as
Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1356–59 (2001)); M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and
Back Again: A Theory of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 321–23.
21. Compare Guinier, supra note 20, at 20–21 (“The 1925 Judiciary Act consolidated the
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normative implications.22 The maps and genealogies presented in this
Article present an important refinement to the understanding of the
consensus norm. Specifically, the unflagging persistence of dissents in
due process doctrine since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868 show that competing due process traditions were not silenced by
any norm of consensus. As explained, the fight over due process is
23
literally a fight over the past and future of tradition. This is the great
genius of the concept of due process—its doctrinal connection to
tradition.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. In Part II, I consider the existing
literature on dissents and describe my place within it. Here I develop
my critique of the empirical method of citation counting as a means to
measure the influence of dissents, and I offer a defense of traditional
doctrinal inquiry. While legal scholarship has and will continue to be
profoundly enriched by techniques and theories drawn from other
academic disciplines, I argue that advancing the understanding of law
will always require careful reading of its primary texts and attention to
the context of its competing traditions. This justifies a hermeneutic
approach.
After this theoretical development, I turn to my concrete examples.
In Part III, I examine the economic due process doctrine introduced
above. Here I argue that two sets of largely uncited dissents greatly
influenced the rise and fall of economic liberty. From the Court’s first
practice of petitioning for certiorari, which drastically reduced the Court’s caseload and
heightened its discretion. These changes unlocked the restraints on dissent, and the unanimity
norm buckled under the new conditions of judicial review.” (footnote omitted)), with
Henderson, supra note 20, at 325–26 (citing Thomas Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise
of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361, 362, 364–65 (1988)
(attributing the sudden decline in the “consensus norm” to the Chief Justiceship of Harlan
Fiske Stone and specifically rejecting the Judiciary Act of 1925 thesis)).
22. There was once a flourishing debate and academic literature on whether dissents
improperly undermined or properly advanced the rule of law. See generally Laura Krugman
Ray, Justice Brennan and the Jurisprudence of Dissent, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 307, 308–10 (1988)
(describing the debate and collecting articles from late-Nineteenth through the midTwentieth century). This normative debate largely subsided, or at least narrowed, over the
past decades as commentators have grown accustomed to high rates of dissent on the Court.
See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen, Perpetual Dissents, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV 447, 468–71 (2008)
(making normative argument against practice of dissenters clinging to losing views in
“perpetual dissents”). However, current-Chief Justice John Roberts’s stated goal of
decreasing the number of dissenting opinions may have rekindled this controversy. See, e.g.,
Guinier, supra note 20, at 15 (citing Roberts’s push for fewer dissenting opinions as raising
normative questions about the conflict between unanimity and democratic accountability).
23. See infra Part II.
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occasion to interpret the new Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause in the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases, authority divided into two
schools seeking to control the Clause’s doctrinal meaning. I maintain
that the school favoring a strong due process right, which largely
dominated the Court from the turn of the century until West Coast Hotel
in 1937, derived from the tradition established by the uncited dissent of
Justice Joseph Bradley in Slaughter-House. For the opposing school, I
suggest that Holmes’ Lochner dissent played an instrumental role in the
ultimate demise of liberty of contract despite its formal absence in West
Coast Hotel. Since Lochner’s rise and fall is familiar territory, the
doctrinal tour in Part III is relatively brief and focused on illustrating the
essential contours of my hermeneutic model of dissent through a wellknown example.
In Part IV, I take an in-depth look at a lesser-known due process
debate that burned hot in the 1940s–1960s but seemed all ashes until the
2010 blockbuster, McDonald v. City of Chicago, rekindled former
24
flames. The debate turns on the question of “incorporation”—whether
the substantive protections of the federal Bill of Rights can be applied
against the states via the Due Process Clause. By the time of the Civil
War, it was settled that the Bill of Rights only protected individuals
25
against the Federal Government. After the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, a new school favoring incorporation of the Bill
of Rights against the States recognized potential textual ammunition in
that amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Part IV begins by examining the genealogy of the school favoring
incorporation in detail. I show how Justice Samuel Alito’s plurality
opinion in McDonald, which applied the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear handguns against the States, as recognized in 2008’s
26
controversial District of Columbia v. Heller decision, relied on an
incorporation tradition that stretches all the way back to Justice John
Marshall Harlan (I)’s dissent in an 1884 case called Hurtado v.
27
Justice Hugo Black later reinvigorated the tradition
California.
initiated by Harlan in a series of remarkable dissents from the 1940s that
24. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3032–36 (2010) (recounting
earlier debate over incorporation).
25. See Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
26. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
27. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538–58 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see
also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114–27 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605–17 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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prevailed two decades later.28 The essential claim here is Harlan and
Black’s dissents exerted influence over the pro-incorporation school in a
manner that far exceeded their limited citation by opinions in this line.
This Part then turns to a competing doctrinal tradition that generally
opposed incorporation. Justice John Paul Stevens ostensibly embraced
this anti-incorporation tradition in his final passionate dissent on the
29
Court in McDonald. At first blush, Stevens’ embrace seems strange
because this anti-incorporation tradition explicitly rejected expansion of
criminal procedure rights that Stevens himself undoubtedly welcomed.
However, a hermeneutic analysis helps resolve this tension. I argue that
Stevens’ dissent should not be read literally as defense of the antiincorporation school but rather should be understood instead as a
stirring final lecture for future generations on the proper meaning of
substantive due process doctrine writ large.
In the concluding Part, I consider how dissents, in addition to
shaping internal development of doctrine, also seek to construct
external borders between rival due process territories. Here, I reflect on
how lessons learned about the impact of dissents on due process
doctrine might apply more broadly and explore the implications of this
study on general theories of dissent.
II. DISSENT, CITATION, AND TRADITION
Legal scholars who advocate a citation-based approach to measuring
the influence of legal opinions upon doctrine proceed from solid
premises.30 After all, legal arguments turn on authority and citation
provides the formal mechanism to introduce authority into legal texts.
Every first-year law student quickly learns that it is tantamount to a
28. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68–92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474–77 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
29. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. Drawing on political science work in this area, empirical legal scholars are the most
prominent advocates of a strong citation-based approach in the legal academy. See, e.g.,
Epstein et al., supra note 6, at 17 (citing Fowler, supra note 6, at 324); Richard A. Posner, The
Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511, 534
(1994) (book review) (advocating counting citations as method for measuring influence based
on use of such method to measure scholarly influence). Non-empirical scholars have also
embraced the approach. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical
Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 784 n.11 (2000) (positing a minimum of ten subsequent
citations “as a baseline for canonical status”). I have previously advocated counting citations
to make “a prima facie case” about an opinion’s influence. See Colin Starger, The DNA of an
Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1045, 1072 n.129
(2009).
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cardinal sin in legal writing to assert that a legal rule applies without
citing authority. Initiation into the Bluebook’s esoteric and dreaded
maze of citation forms is an infamous rite of passage into the legal
fraternity. Citation clearly matters enormously. On the surface of
things, measuring an opinion’s influence by the number of times it has
been cited seems entirely sensible.
Yet this citation-counting heuristic suffers from shortcomings that
become especially acute when undertaking to measure the influence of
dissents. Consider first that counting citations is potentially both overinclusive and under-inclusive as a measure of an opinion’s influence
over doctrine. Inclusivity problems initially stem from the premium
placed in our system of precedent on recent cases. Supreme Court
opinions may garner citations not because they contain particularly
insightful discussions of a legal proposition, but simply because they
mark the latest affirmation of that proposition developed in a longer
line of opinions. That older opinions get cited less than newer ones does
not automatically mean that the newer cases exert more sway over
current doctrine. In addition to complications caused by preference for
“fresh precedent,” an under-inclusivity problem potentially plagues
dissents because dissents lack formal precedential value. While citation
generally builds the authority of a legal argument, citation to dissents
risks undermining the authority of the argument. The incentive not to
cite dissents is strong, and a dissent may influence doctrine far more
than its number of citations would indicate.
Beyond inclusivity problems, a problem we might call “loss of
context” presents the deeper theoretical obstacle to the citationcounting method. In legal texts like Supreme Court opinions, every
citation does not have equal weight or value in the larger argument.
Some citations may provide the only authority for discrete but hotlycontested propositions. Other citations may come in strings and stand
for abstract and entirely uncontroversial principles. The plethora of
introductory signals (see, accord, etc.) available to characterize the
relationships between propositions and their supporting authority
signify a range of meanings in citation not captured by any flat counting
31
technique. Context matters when reading text. Not all cites share an

31. See generally THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2, at 54–55
(Colum. L. Rev. Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010).
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equal influence value. Citation quantity alone therefore cannot measure
32
the quality of influence.
This critique is not offered to suggest that citation is unimportant.
Rather, the argument is ultimately against an exclusively citation-based
approach to measuring the influence of dissents upon doctrine. Here, it
is worth recalling that the English word “doctrine” literally derives from
the Latin doctrina meaning teaching and corresponds to the word
33
disciplina meaning learning. Just because Supreme Court Justices do
not cite an opinion frequently (or at all) does not mean that they have
not read it, learned from it, or become convinced to follow its teaching.
Similarly, an opinion that has not been cited by the Court in over fifty
years may still provide the canonical understanding of an area of law.
That understanding is simply transmitted through other venues—
textbooks, treatises, law review articles, etc.
Rather than rely
exclusively on citations in Supreme Court opinions, a more sensitive
approach admits evidence of influence from the diverse texts and
contexts that constitute doctrinal tradition.
The mapping method explored in this Article explores one such
more sensitive approach. My approach initially borrows from an older
line of scholarship that highlighted the vital role dissents play in

32. Some scholars have devised deeply sophisticated quantitative systems that offer
considerably more nuance than a simple “add ‘em up” counting approach. For example,
drawing on both network and Internet search theories, Professor Fowler and his colleagues
measure the “legal importance” of Supreme Court cases based on number of times that an
individual case is cited by other cases (inward citations) and by the number of citations the
individual case makes to other cases (outward citations). See Fowler et al., supra note 6, at
328–30. The method is dynamic and iterative because inward and outward relevance scores
depend on the relevance scores of the other cases in the network, which change over time. Id.
at 328. While ingenious quantitatively, this technique remains hermeneutically flat. The
authors simply use Shepard’s Citations to “identif[y] each instance in which one of the
Court’s majority opinions referenced a previously decided Court majority opinion.” Id. at
328. They do not distinguish between citation signals, do not track the proposition a case is
cited for, and do not score how important the citation is to the larger argument. While these
omissions are entirely understandable (it would be well-nigh impossible to code a 26,681 case
network at this level of detail), it does render the technique less than useful for tracking the
influence of a case upon specific doctrine. Moreover, the Fowler et al. study actually omits all
dissenting opinions from its network analysis, which renders it incapable of speaking to the
influence of dissent on doctrine.
33. PETER GOODRICH, READING THE LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
METHOD AND TECHNIQUES 136 (1986). As Professor Goodrich observes, “Doctrine consists
of the truths handed down by educators—by priests, judges, politicians, scholars and so on—
all of whom are experts in the classics, custodians of ancient truths which are preserved for
and presented to their contemporary audiences.” Id.
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sustaining competing constitutional traditions.34 I therefore assume that
doctrine can be usefully divided into competing schools.
This
assumption is historically justified as scholars have long recognized that
the federalist and anti-federalist debates that led to the adoption of the
Bill of Rights were carried on by successive generations of doctrinal
antagonists who still fundamentally differed over the limits of state and
35
Of course, the various and competing schools of
national power.
doctrinal thought evolved and mutated as our turbulent history
unfolded—but every generation nonetheless inherited allegiances and
36
insights from prior traditions taught, learned, and handed down.
Dissents have long served both to transmit the teachings of exiled
traditions and also to steer old traditions in new directions.
The centrality of competing traditions in my understanding of
doctrinal dialectics justifies a specific focus on due process dissents. Due
process provides an advantageous point of departure because of the
doctrine’s self-conscious concern with the very concept of tradition. The
Court has variously explained due process as protecting “the ‘traditions
37
and conscience of our people,’” “‘traditional notions of fair play and
34. In a wonderful article published in 1894, Hampton Carson vaunted dissenting
opinions as “the best exposition to be found in the books of the views of two contending
schools of constitutional interpretation” and as interesting “because of the importance of the
doctrines contended for, and the way they have been woven into the warp and woof of our
jurisprudence, to become in time of controlling importance in determining the pattern of the
texture.” Hampton L. Carson, Great Dissenting Opinions, 50 ALB. L.J. 120, 121 (1894–1895).
In more recent years, scholars have by and large neglected this well-pedigreed approach to
dissent.
35. See, e.g., Matthew P. Harrington, Regulatory Takings and the Original Understanding
of the Takings Clause, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV 2053, 2063–66 (2004) (describing Federalist
and anti-Federalist debates that led to Bill of Rights); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Original
Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James Madison and the Founders’ Search for a Workable
Balance Between Federal and State Power, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1261–62 (1989)
(“[T]he historical record reminds us that it was the opponents rather than the supporters of
the Constitution who fought hardest for the addition of a bill of rights . . . .”). Given this
history, one might imagine the Bill of Rights as a kind of “dissent” to the original “majority
opinion” of the Constitution.
36. Evolutions and mutations in schools of thought occur in politics as well as doctrine.
Though they bear the same names, today’s Democrats and Republicans are markedly
different from the Democrats and Republicans of 1960 or of 1860. Just as the poles defining
the political landscape have changed since the founding, so too have the poles of legal
doctrine. Nonetheless, Hampton Carson’s description in 1894 of “two contending schools of
constitutional interpretation” battling over “the expanding empire of national Federalism and
the shrinking reservation of State sovereignty” continues to capture an essential dynamic in
modern constitutional debates. See Carson, supra note 34, at 121.
37. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320–21 (2009) (quoting Medina

16 - STARGER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

7/9/2012 10:10 PM

EXILE ON MAIN STREET

1267

substantial justice,’”38 and rights “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
39
and tradition.’” Invoking tradition in this context is no accident—the
very phrase “due process of law” has an ancient origin tracing to Latin
in the Magna Carta of 1215, influentially translated by Sir Edward Coke
40
The rich legal history behind “due process”
in the 17th Century.
fundamentally implicates “those canons of decency and fairness which
41
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples.” Debates
over due process contest the soul of our legal tradition.
Yet these debates also reveal that our legal tradition is not
monolithic. We no more share a single inherited tradition than we do a
42
single morality. Due process majorities and due process dissents have
always responded to the same Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but they have staked competing claims to the interpretation of its

v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992)) (emphasis added).
38. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (emphasis added).
39. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis added).
40. See WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE
GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 375 (2d ed. 1914) (stating original Latin text from Chapter
39 of the 1215 Magna Carta translated as “[n]o freeman shall be taken or [and] imprisoned or
disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed . . . except by the lawful judgment of
his peers or [and] by the law of the land”). While modern scholars tend to refer to the Magna
Carta, see generally id., early commentators generally referred to “Magna Charta” (with no
definite article). See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521–28 (1884) (analyzing
interpretations of the Latin phrase “per legem terræ” in “Magna Charta”). In this Article, I
employ the modern usage. Though Sir Edmond Coke was not the first to interpret the key
phrase “per legem terræ” (by the law of the land) to mean “due process of law,” his
translation directly influenced early American understandings of the phrase. See Robert E.
Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 958–59; see also, e.g., Hurtado,
110 U.S. at 521–28.
41. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
42. The connection between tradition and morality is fundamental. Tradition provides
the ultimate authority and justification for morality. As Hans-Georg Gadamer argues in his
classic study of hermeneutics:
That which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has an authority that is
nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by the fact that the authority of
what has been handed down to us—and not just what is clearly grounded—always
has power over our attitudes and behavior. . . . The real force of morals, for
example, is based on tradition. They are freely taken over but by no means created
by a free insight or grounded on reasons. This is precisely what we call tradition:
the ground of their validity.
GADAMER, supra note 9, at 281–82.
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tradition. Writing in dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan (II) once
described due process as a balance:
[T]he balance struck by this country, having regard to what
history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well
as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living
thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it
could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has
43
survived is likely to be sound.
44

Harlan’s definition of due process is certainly contested, but his
description of the dynamic between past and present perfectly captures
a hermeneutic understanding of tradition.
Hermeneutics generally concerns the relationship between parts and
whole in discourse. This relationship is mutually constitutive and
creates meaning. Take a simple example. The meaning of a sentence
depends on the sense of its component words. Yet the meanings of
individual words themselves depend on the sentence in which they
45
appear. Text informs context and context informs text. Scholars call
43. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan’s specific
target in Poe was a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of contraceptives, which Harlan
argued violated a right to “privacy of the home” protected by the Due Process Clause. See
generally id. at 548–55 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Four years after Poe, the Court struck down
Connecticut’s law banning the use of contraceptives. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485–86 (1965) (finding statute violated a “right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older
than our political parties, older than our school system”). Notably, Harlan concurred in
Griswold’s judgment but did not join the majority opinion because of objections to its
“incorporation” approach. See id. at 499–500 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). Harlan’s
views on incorporation are explored infra Part III.C.
44. Harlan’s analysis in his Poe dissent fairly defines the “living tradition” school of
substantive due process methodology. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct.
3020, 3090, 3096 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (declaring allegiance to this approach). The
competing school employs a more strictly historical approach to understanding substantive
due process. See id. at 3057 (Scalia, J., concurring) (disputing living tradition approach). The
Court has long debated whether Harlan’s approach states the current doctrine. Compare
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 756 n.4 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining
how the Court has adopted Harlan’s Poe result and reasoning), with id. at 721 n.17 (Chief
Justice William Rehnquist conceding that Harlan’s dissent had influence, but denying that its
reasoning exclusively controls substantive due process doctrine). This debate continued in
McDonald. See generally infra Part III.
45. See GADAMER, supra note 9, at 291 (“We know this from learning ancient
languages. We learn that we must ‘construe’ a sentence before we attempt to understand the
linguistic meaning of the individual parts of the sentence. But the process of construal is itself
already governed by an expectation of meaning that follows from the context of what has
gone before. . . . [T]he movement of understanding is constantly from the whole to the part
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this back-and-forth between parts/whole, words/sentence, and
46
text/context a hermeneutic circle. The concept of a hermeneutic circle
applies well in legal discourse as it describes the relationship between
47
The
individual opinions and the collective doctrine they form.
meaning of an opinion depends on the doctrinal context from which it
emerges. Yet an opinion also reads past doctrine, interprets its
meaning, and advances its understanding. Opinions thus modify the
doctrine they interpret. Successful opinions—including dissents—
48
change the course of living tradition and liberate it from dead custom.
The due process opinion maps in this Article reflect this
hermeneutic dynamic. After identifying competing traditions within the
due process arenas of economic liberty and incorporation, the genealogy
for each rival school is rendered separately. Though I have selected
which members of the doctrinal family appear in each genealogy, solid
arrows linking opinions derive from the opinions’ own genealogical
account—their citations. Note that arrows between opinions point
backwards from “child” to “parent.” This both reverses the traditional
direction of arrows seen in human genealogies and points toward the
limits of the genealogical metaphor. Quite obviously, legal opinions do
not have two biological parents and they are not born as helpless infants
that must grow and mature before they can reproduce. Rather, opinions
appear in discourse fully formed and intelligent—much like Athena
leaping from the head of Zeus.
Yet unlike even mighty Athena, legal opinions actually choose their
own ancestry. Opinions literally define their place in doctrine by
and back to the whole.”).
46. For a thorough discussion of the hermeneutic circle, see id. at 291–94.
47. Cf. Larry A. DiMatteo & Blake D. Morant, Contracts in Context and Contracts as
Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 549, 560 (2010) (arguing that “contract law can be
understood as a thick texture of rules and doctrines that form a hermeneutic circle—one that
poses the paradox that the whole cannot be understood without understanding the parts and
the parts cannot be understood without comprehension of the whole.”).
48. Professor Berman has described a similar dynamic as endorsing historicity over
historicism, and tradition over traditionalism. See Harold J. Berman, The Historical
Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 13, 18–19 (2005). Berman writes:
Historicism is the return to the past; historicity emphasizes the element of
continuity from past to future in the development of the culture of a society,
including its legal culture. In the words of a distinguished contemporary historian,
“Tradition is the living faith of the dead; traditionalism is the dead faith of the
living.”
Id. (quoting JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 65 (1984)).
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including or excluding ancestral opinions when reciting their own
genealogy.
An opinion may cite dozens of cases for various
propositions contained within it. The pool of potential parents is large.
Singling out the pertinent ancestral lines requires close reading of text
and, where an opinion keeps mum about its true parentage, of
surrounding context and tradition. It is in the realm of uncited
ancestry—dotted arrows in the opinion maps—that dissents often
quietly exert their influence.
Before turning to our first concrete study, I want to emphasize that
the opinion maps presented here do not purport to depict the whole
doctrine in question. The maps are not the territory. A vast universe of
texts has affected each of the territories of due process doctrine
explored. The point of the maps is not to provide exhaustive detail, but
rather to sketch the main lines of the competing doctrinal schools. To
deploy another analogy, the maps presented are like maps of
constellations. From a sparkling universe of opinions, I draw lines
between the best and brightest stars. Like constellations, the real power
in the connections drawn lies less in the raw images than in the stories it
allows the observer to tell.
III. DUE PROCESS AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY
The debate over a due process right to economic liberty implicates
one of the most infamous constitutional crises in American history.
During the early days of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal, the
Supreme Court blocked economic legislation on due process grounds,
relying on Lochner and its progeny.49 The oft-repeated tale of FDR’s
infamous court-packing plan launched in response to the Court’s
perceived intransigence and of Justice Owen Roberts’ fabled “switch in
time that saved nine” in 1937’s West Coast Hotel decision need not be
50
revisited here. Rather, the story I want to tell is of two dissents and
their powerful impact upon the competing “substantive due process”
(hereafter “SDP”) lines of economic liberty doctrine. These two
dissents—by Justice Bradley in 1873’s Slaughter-House and by Justice
Holmes in 1905’s Lochner—respectively, contributed to this doctrine’s

49. See David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the
Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 299, 299–302 (Michael C.
Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009).
50. For an excellent recent account, see NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES
AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 103–21 (2010).
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rise and fall, and yet went uncited within Supreme Court opinions in the
line. This Part argues for their proper places in the genealogy.
The battles in this territory generally pitted health and welfare
regulations enacted pursuant to state police power against individuals
who opposed these regulations as interfering with their economic
liberty. Supreme Court opinions in the tradition favoring police power
and opposed to a strong right to economic liberty are represented in
Figure 1. Figure 2 below shows opinions from the rival tradition that
advocated for a strong right to economic liberty to curb state police
power. Justice Holmes’ Lochner dissent appears in the middle of Figure
1 while Justice Bradley’s Slaughter-House dissent appears on the left
side of Figure 2. Both dissents have only dotted arrows pointing to
them. After presenting the raw genealogical data underlying Figures 1
and 2, this Part first examines Holmes’ dissent in Lochner and then
Bradley’s dissent in Slaughter-House and justifies their asserted
connection to the traditions within which they are pictured.
All SDP opinions theoretically interpret the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868. In practice, SDP opinions
usually interpret SDP precedent to judge whether a state has
“deprive[d] any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
51
of law.” Unlike the incorporation doctrine considered in the next Part,
the debate over a SDP right to economic right to liberty, or at least the
52
narrower “liberty of contract” debate, is largely defunct. For that
reason, the opinion maps here have relatively few data points.
Figure 1 depicts opinions that found no protected “liberty” interest
“deprive[d]” by state regulations at issue. In chronological order, the
opinions in this line are: the Slaughter-House Cases (Justice Samuel
53
Miller for the Court, 1873); Holden v. Hardy (Justice Henry Brown for
54
the Court, 1898); Lochner v. New York (Justice Oliver Wendell
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. Although some scholars have suggested that economic substantive due process has
been born again, see, e.g., Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the
Right of Livelihood, 82 KY. L.J. 397, 397–98 & nn.1–2 (1993–1994), the fact remains that that
precedent set by West Coast Hotel has not been challenged in any meaningful way. Westlaw’s
KeyCite records no negative authority at all regarding West Coast Hotel.
53. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Slaughter-House was a 5–4
decision. Justice Samuel Miller wrote the majority opinion. See id. at 57. Justice Stephen
Field dissented, with Chief Justice Salmon Chase, Justice Noah Swayne, and Justice Joseph
Bradley joining. See id. at 83, 111 (Field, J., dissenting). Justice Bradley also wrote a
separate, solo dissent. See id. at 111 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
54. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). Holden was a 7–2 decision. Justice Henry
Brown delivered the opinion of the Court. See id. at 380. Justice David Brewer and Justice
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Holmes dissenting, 1905);55 Bunting v. Oregon (Justice Joseph McKenna
56
for the Court, 1917); Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of
57
Columbia (Justice William Howard Taft dissenting, 1923); Adkins
58
(Justice Holmes dissenting, 1923); and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
59
In
(Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes for the Court, 1937).
genealogical order, the direct citations in this line are: West Coast Hotel
60
(Hughes)→ Adkins (Taft) + Adkins (Holmes); Adkins (Taft)→
61
Bunting (McKenna); Lochner (Holmes)→ Holden (Brown);62 Holden
63
(Brown)→ Slaughter-House (Miller). The gaps in direct citation of this

Rufus Peckham dissented without opinion. See id. at 398.
55. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner was a 5–4 decision with Justice
Rufus Peckham writing for the majority. Id. at 52. Holmes authored a solo dissent. Id. at 74–
76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice John Marshall Harlan (the first) wrote a dissent in which
Justices Edward White and William Day concurred. See id. at 65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). Bunting was a 5–3 decision with Justice
Joseph McKenna writing for the majority. Id. Chief Justice Edward White and Justices
Willis Van Devanter and James McReynolds dissented without opinion. Id. at 439. Justice
Louis Brandeis took no part in the decision. See id.
57. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Adkins was a 5–3 decision. Justice
George Sutherland penned the majority opinion. Id. at 539. Chief Justice William Howard
Taft wrote a dissent in which Justice Edward Sanford concurred. Id. at 562, 567 (Taft, C.J.,
dissenting). Justice Holmes wrote a separate solo dissent. Id. at 567 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Justice Brandeis took no part in the decision. Id. at 562.
58. Id. at 567 (Holmes, J., dissenting). For Adkins’ vote break-down, see supra note 57.
59. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). West Coast Hotel was a 5–4
decision with Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes writing for the majority. Id. at 386. Justice
Sutherland wrote a dissent on behalf of himself and Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and
Pierce Butler. Id. at 400–01 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 390–91 (citing fact of Adkins dissents); id. at 395–96 (quoting from Taft and
Holmes dissents); id. at 396–97 (same); id. at 397 (“We think that the views thus expressed [by
Taft and Holmes] are sound and that the decision in the Adkins case was a departure from
the true application of the principles governing the regulation by the State of the relation of
employer and employed.”).
61. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 563 (Taft, C.J., dissenting) (“The right of the Legislature under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to limit the hours of employment on the score of the
health of the employee . . . has been firmly established.”); id. at 563–64 (discussing Bunting as
evidence of this principle and stating that Bunting overruled Lochner sub silentio).
62. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“It is settled
by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in
many ways which we as legislators might think as injudicious . . . and which . . . interfere with
the liberty to contract.”); id. (“The decision sustaining an eight-hour law for miners is still
recent.” (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898))).
63. Holden, 169 U.S. at 398 (“We are of opinion that the act in question [i.e., an eighthour day for miners] was a valid exercise of the police power of the State . . . .”); id. at 382
(citing Slaughter-House as upholding validity of monopoly “as a proper police regulation for
the health and comfort of the people”).
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Figure 2.

genealogy that require arguments are therefore: Adkins (Taft) + Adkins
(Holmes) + Bunting (McKenna)→ Lochner (Holmes).
Figure 2 depicts opinions that favored an individual’s economic
rights over state police power. In chronological order, the opinions in
this line are: Slaughter-House (Justice Joseph Bradley dissenting,
64
1873); Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v.
Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co. (Justice
65
Bradley concurring, 1884); Allgeyer v. Louisiana (Justice Rufus
64. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 111 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
For Slaughter-House’s vote break-down, see supra note 53.
65. Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-
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Peckham for the Court, 1897);66 Lochner (Justice Peckham for the
67
68
Court, 1905); Adkins (Justice George Sutherland for the Court, 1923);
69
West Coast Hotel (Justice Sutherland dissenting, 1937). In genealogical
order, the direct citations in this line are: West Coast Hotel
70
(Sutherland)→ Adkins (Sutherland); Adkins (Sutherland)→ Lochner
71
72
(Peckham); Lochner (Peckham)→ Allgeyer (Peckham); Allgeyer
73
(Peckham)→ Butchers’ Union (Bradley). The direct citation gap in
this genealogy that requires argument is therefore: Butchers’ Union
(Bradley)→ Slaughter-House (Bradley).

Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884). This case was decided 9–0.
Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court. Id. at 746. Justice Bradley concurred
separately, with Justice John Marshall Harlan and Justice William Woods concurring in this
concurrence. See id. at 760 (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Field also
separately concurred. Id. at 754 (Field, J., concurring).
66. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). Allgeyer was a 9–0 decision. Justice
Peckham delivered the opinion of the court. Id. at 583.
67. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52. For Lochner’s vote break-down, see supra note 55.
68. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 539 (1923). For Adkins’ vote break-down,
see supra note 57.
69. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
For West Coast Hotel’s vote break-down, see supra note 59.
70. Id. at 401 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“The principles and authorities relied upon to
sustain the [majority’s] judgment were considered in Adkins . . . and their lack of application
to cases like the one in hand was pointed out. A sufficient answer to all that is now said will
be found in [Adkins].” (citations omitted)). Here, Justice Sutherland also specifically cited to
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), to answer the Adkins majority.
W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 401. For the reasons of economy, I have not included this case in
the Figure 2 opinion map.
71. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 545 (citing Lochner among other cases standing for the
proposition “[t]hat the right to contract about one’s affairs is a part of the liberty of the
individual protected by [the Due Process] clause, is settled by the decisions of this Court and
is no longer open to question”).
72. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) for the
proposition that “[t]he general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of
the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution”).
73. See Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589 (“The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth
Amendment] . . . is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to . . . pursue any livelihood or
avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary,
and essential . . . .”); id. at 589–90 (quoting Bradley’s concurring opinion in Butchers’ Union
for the proposition that “‘the liberty of pursuit—the right to follow any of the ordinary
callings of life’” is a protected liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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A. Justifying Implied Citation to Holmes’ Lochner Dissent
In 1992’s Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, the Court considered whether to overrule its landmark abortion
74
decision, Roe v. Wade. After a canonical exposition of stare decisis, the
75
majority opinion concluded it was bound by its prior precedent. The
opinion then examined analogies between Roe and two “national
controversies” of “comparable dimension” where the Court had
overruled its own precedent:
The first example is that line of cases identified with Lochner,
which imposed substantive limitations on legislation limiting
economic autonomy in favor of health and welfare regulation,
adopting, in Justice Holmes’s view, the theory of laissez-faire.
The Lochner decisions were exemplified by Adkins, in which this
Court held it to be an infringement of constitutionally protected
liberty of contract to require the employers of adult women to
satisfy minimum wage standards. Fourteen years later, West
Coast Hotel signaled the demise of Lochner by overruling
76
Adkins.
The majority then attributed Lochner’s demise to the failure of markets
in the Depression, which made the Court realize that “‘[t]he older world
of laissez-faire was . . . dead’” and thus “required the new choice of
constitutional principle.”77
Three aspects of the Casey majority’s neat genealogical account of
78
Lochner warrant our attention. First, consistent with the genealogy in
Figure 1, the opinion acknowledges West Coast Hotel as the end of the
Lochner line. Second, the opinion specifically cites to Holmes’ Lochner
dissent to characterize that case as embracing the theory of laissez-faire.
Finally, the opinion explains the Court’s subsequent reversal of its own
precedent by reference to the failure of laissez-faire. Without directly
74. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
75. Id. at 854–61.
76. Id. at 861 (internal citations omitted).
77. Id. at 861–62 (quoting ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 85 (1949)).
78. The majority’s second example of a controversial case that was overruled was Plessy
v. Fegurson. See id. at 862–63 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and its
repudiation by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). The Casey majority
rejected any analogy between Roe and Lochner or Plessy. Id. at 861–64.
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stating that his reasoning persuaded the West Coast Hotel majority, the
narrative logic of the account nonetheless has Holmes playing a role in
Lochner’s demise. Yet we know that this story told in 1992 is
contestable since Chief Justice Hughes’ majority opinion in West Coast
Hotel did not cite to Holmes’ dissent or to any other authority that
79
previously cited to Holmes’ dissent. The real question is whether the
Justices in 1937—the year of West Coast Hotel—were affected by
Holmes’ dissent. Figure 1 asserts that the answer is “yes.”
To defend this answer, we first turn to West Coast Hotel itself. The
case arose out of a chambermaid’s civil suit against her hotel employer
to recover the difference between the wages paid her and the minimum
wage fixed pursuant to Washington state’s minimum wage law for
80
women. The Court in Adkins had previously struck down a similar
81
Washington, D.C. minimum wage law for women and children. Of
course, Chief Justice Hughes’s majority opinion in West Coast Hotel
82
overruled Adkins. In so doing, Hughes explicitly cited and adopted the
views of the two Adkins dissenters, Chief Justice Taft and Justice
83
Holmes. This invocation of dissent as authority is itself important as it
signals the redemption of an exiled tradition. However, Hughes did not
formally overrule Lochner nor did he separately invoke Holmes’
dissent. The question remains whether the dissents in Adkins or the
majority in Bunting can be linked to Holmes’ dissent.
The first dotted arrow to consider is that from Holmes’ own dissent
in Adkins back to his prior effort in Lochner. First and foremost, the
authority for connecting these two opinions derives from their common
author. Holmes obviously believed his own prior argument from

79. Writing in dissent in Casey, Chief Justice William Rehnquist disputed the Casey
majority’s suggestion that the Court’s realization of the bankruptcy of laissez-faire led it to
overrule Lochner. Id. at 960–61 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). However, Rehnquist tellingly
also included Holmes in his counter-narrative: “When the Court finally recognized its error in
West Coast Hotel . . . it did not state that Lochner had been based on an economic view that
had fallen into disfavor, and that it therefore should be overruled. Chief Justice Hughes in his
opinion for the Court simply recognized what Justice Holmes had previously recognized in his
Lochner dissent, that ‘[t]he Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.’” Id. at 961
(alteration in original).
80. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 388 (1937).
81. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923). The underlying disputes in
Adkins were civil; both cases essentially involved actions against the minimum wage board to
prevent them from enforcing orders to pay minimum wages or suffer penalties. Id. at 542–43.
82. See W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400 (overruling Adkins).
83. See id. at 395–96, 396–97; Fig.1, supra p.1258; see also supra note 60.
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Lochner when making his case in Adkins. He also likely re-read his
previous opinion before penning his Adkins dissent. In both opinions,
Holmes stressed that the state has long had the power to interfere with
liberty of contract and gave the same two “ancient examples” of
84
In both opinions, he preached
“Sunday laws and usury laws.”
deference to the legislature and the irrelevance of a judge’s private
85
belief about the good of legislation. With such clear parallels, the
formal absence of citation between Holmes’ two opinions signifies
nothing more than modest reticence.
The case for connecting Taft’s Adkins dissent back to Holmes’
Lochner dissent is also strong. Initially, Taft plainly echoed Holmes’
famous line “[t]his case is decided upon an economic theory which a
86
large part of the country does not entertain” when he wrote in Adkins
that “it is not the function of this Court to hold congressional acts
invalid simply because they are passed to carry out economic views
87
which the Court believes to be unwise or unsound.” Second, Taft cited
88
the same precedent as Holmes had done to support his conclusion.
Even without this congruence of their arguments, it is almost
inconceivable that Taft was unfamiliar with Holmes’ Lochner dissent.
By 1923, the opinion had already found fame.
This Article opened with reference to a 1919 Harvard Law Review
89
article by Judge Hough that praised Holmes’ dissent. Two years later,
in 1921, Benjamin Cardozo published his highly regarded book The
90
Nature of the Judicial Process. In it, Cardozo wrote of a new epoch in
constitutional thought dawning in 1883:
84. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). But see
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Usury laws prohibit contracts by which a
man receives more than so much interest for the money that he lends. . . . Some Sunday laws
prohibit practically all contracts during one-seventh of our whole life.”).
85. Compare Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I strongly believe that
my agreement or disagreement [with a law] has nothing to do with the right of a majority to
embody their opinions in law.”), with Adkins, 261 U.S. at 570 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The
criterion of constitutionality is not whether we believe the law to be for the public good.”).
86. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
87. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 562 (Taft, C.J., dissenting).
88. In Lochner, Holmes had cited Holden as primary authority for permitting the
maximum-hours law to stand as a legitimate exercise of police power. See Lochner, 198 U.S.
at 75; Fig.1, supra p.1258; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text. In Adkins, Taft also
used Holden as primary authority to support the same conclusion. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 563
(Taft, C.J., dissenting) (citing Holden).
89. See Hough, supra note 1.
90. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). The
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If the new epoch had then dawned, it was still obscured by fog
and cloud. . . . Even as late as 1905, the decision in Lochner still
spoke in terms untouched by the light of the new spirit. It is the
dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes, which men will turn to in
the future as the beginning of an era. In the instance, it was the
voice of a minority. In principle, it has become the voice of a
new dispensation, which has written itself into law . . . . That is
the conception of liberty which is dominant today. It has its
91
critics even yet, but its dominance is, I think, assured.
Though Cardozo had not yet assumed his seat on the Supreme Court,92
this passage shows that, in the eyes of serious jurists of the day, Holmes’
dissent represented an ascendant school of thought in Supreme Court
discourse. Taft—Chief Justice and former President of the United
States—was one such serious jurist belonging to the ascendant school.
This brings us to the case for the dotted arrow connecting Justice
McKenna’s Bunting opinion back to Holmes’ dissent. Decided six years
prior to Adkins and twelve years after Lochner, Bunting upheld
maximum-hours legislation regulating millers against a due process
93
challenge raised by an employer convicted of violating the law.
Though this result flatly contradicted Lochner’s striking down of
maximum-hours legislation regulating bakers, Justice McKenna’s
opinion for the Court did not mention Lochner—majority or dissent—at
94
all. The glaring incongruity of results between Lochner and Bunting
book derived from Cardozo’s delivery of the Storrs Lectures at Yale University. Id.
91. Id. at 79–80 (footnotes and citation omitted). The second set of ellipses in the block
quote omits Cardozo’s liberal quoting of the most famous lines from Holmes’ opinion.
92. Cardozo joined the Supreme Court in 1932 and served until 1938. See SCOTUS
VISUAL HISTORY, supra note 2. Unsurprisingly, Cardozo joined the West Coast Hotel
majority that struck down Adkins and ended Lochner’s run. Providing neat citation for this
proposition is tricky given the Court’s usual practice of not listing justices who joined the
majority opinion. However, since Cardozo was on the Court in 1937, and not among four
West Coast Hotel dissenters, a process of elimination confirms he was in the majority. See
supra note 59 and accompanying text.
93. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 434, 438 (1917). The case came to the Supreme
Court on a writ of error from the Supreme Court of Oregon. Id. at 426.
94. See id. at 433–39. McKenna barely cited any authority at all in his opinion,
emphasizing instead comparative statistics that showed Oregon’s law was not unreasonable or
arbitrary. See id. The narrowness of the decision appears to derive from the limited claims of
the plaintiff-in-error. Id. at 438. The only relevant authority McKenna cited was Rast v. Van
Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 365 (1916), for the proposition that the Court must defer
to the legislature. Id. at 437. The Bunting dissenters did not help the situation since they
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led Chief Justice Taft to later declare in Adkins: “It is impossible for me
to reconcile the Bunting Case and the Lochner Case and I have always
95
supposed that the Lochner Case was thus overruled sub silentio.”
Taft’s sub silentio argument assumed that McKenna had read Lochner
but deliberately ignored it. If this is credible, it is similarly credible to
96
argue that McKenna had read Holmes’ dissent but not cited it. This
argument is made more plausible given the standing of Holmes’ dissent
among jurists as described above.
Even if this argument extending Taft’s particular sub silentio
reasoning is unpersuasive, it should be recognized that the general
phenomenon of sub silentio overrulings challenges the empiricists’
exclusive reliance on citation to measure the influence of opinions over
97
doctrine. Sometimes the Court is silent about what it is really doing.
In these instances, true understanding requires reading “between the
lines” to catch the subtext. This suggests a kind of hermeneutic reading
that looks to surrounding context and tradition instead of only the literal
text to grasp an opinion’s meaning. In the case of Bunting, the
surrounding tradition is the no-strong-right strand of economic liberty
doctrine. Because it is connected to this tradition, Bunting ultimately
belongs to the same line of cases as Holmes’ Lochner dissent, which has
been read since at least 1918 to exemplify this school of thought.
In the end, whether Holmes’ Lochner dissent links into Figure 1’s
genealogy from two or three opinions is unimportant. What matters is
the soundness of the proposition that his dissent fits in the tradition
leading up to West Coast Hotel. This, I submit, has been established.
Contemporary evidence shows that scholars and jurists celebrated
issued no opinion. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
95. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 564 (1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting). Of
course, Adkins technically differed from Bunting and Lochner in that it concerned minimumwage legislation rather than maximum-hour legislation. However, Taft rejected “the
distinction between a minimum of wages and a maximum of hours in limiting the liberty to
contract. . . . In absolute freedom of contract the one term is as important as the other, for
both enter equally into the consideration given and received, a restriction as to one is not any
greater in essence than the other, and is of the same kind. One is the multiplier and the other
the multiplicand.” Id.
96. Taft’s assumption does seem credible given his position on the Court. Even before
the age of electronic databases, it seems unlikely that all of the Justices in the Bunting
majority simply forgot or never read Lochner.
97. For insightful recent analyses of sub silentio overrulings, see Barry Friedman, The
Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1
(2010); and Christopher J. Peters, Under-the-Table Overruling, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1067
(2008).
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Holmes’ opinion well before West Coast Hotel. Almost all modern law
students encounter Holmes during their studies, and it seems reasonable
to infer that his Lochner dissent entered the curriculum not long after it
was written. The qualities that make the dissent amenable to teaching—
its perfect brevity, trenchant analysis, and memorable aphorisms—were
obvious from its first publication in the reporters. The continuity of
tradition indicates that Holmes’ Lochner dissent helped sway the
constitutional conversation that led to Lochner’s overruling.
The emphasis here remains on tradition. I do not claim that
Holmes’ dissent exerted more influence than all other opinions or the
98
social facts on the ground. In fact, it bears emphasis that Holmes
himself stood on the shoulders of those who came before him. Holmes
did not found the school supporting the state’s police power to enact
health and welfare regulations. Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, Holmes’
opinion merely marked the first time the no-strong-right school had
appeared in dissent. The story of Holmes’ dissent is thus intertwined
with the story of the opinions that came before it. It is to that earlier
story—and the remarkable rise of economic liberty from a tradition
initiated in an uncited dissent—that we now turn.
B. Justifying Implied Citation to Bradley’s Slaughter-House Dissent
Although the constitutional conflict in Lochner flared before and
after that case, Justice Peckham and Justice Holmes are now
remembered as the most famous representatives of the clashing
doctrines. This is for good reason. Peckham and Holmes made worthy
adversaries. Holmes, for one, had a gift for turning phrases. His
proposed due process test in Lochner has reverberated over the years:
[T]he word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
98. Some commentators, for example, have suggested that Justice Harlan’s dissent
actually exerted more influence over the course of doctrine. See, e.g., Jason A. Adkins, Note,
Meet Me at the (West Coast) Hotel: The Lochner Era and the Demise of Roe v. Wade, 90
MINN. L. REV. 500, 507 (2005) (“While the majority opinion and Holmes’s dissent represent
the polar extremes in the debate over substantive due process, it was Justice Harlan’s
approach in Lochner that later provided the rationale for its eventual reversal in West Coast
Hotel.”). While there is undoubtedly merit to this position, I have chosen not to chart
Harlan’s Lochner dissent in this map or analyze its influence over the discourse. My modest
goal in this Part is simply to establish that Holmes’ dissent played some role in shaping the
debate despite its lack of citation. Since Harlan’s dissent also went uncited, the same essential
point could be made of his dissent.

16 - STARGER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

7/9/2012 10:10 PM

EXILE ON MAIN STREET

1281

opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
99
traditions of our people and our law.
While compellingly put, Holmes’ conclusion that liberty of contract fell
outside “the traditions of our people and our law” was certainly
disputable at the time.100 Indeed, as Figure 2 proposes, Peckham built
upon a tradition that stretched back at least as far as Justice Bradley’s
101
dissent in Slaughter-House. Justice Peckham’s remarkable success in
restoring this exiled tradition to doctrinal supremacy in Lochner—even
if ultimately reversed—deserves recognition.
The story of Peckham’s success is also the story of the redemption of
Bradley’s Slaughter-House dissent. However, since the arrow to this
Bradley’s dissent in Figure 2 is dotted, this means that connecting his
dissent to subsequent tradition cannot be established through chains of
citation alone. Yet the connection is quite simple to forge and has
102
indeed been recognized by previous scholars. The precise details and
103
nature of the connection, on the other hand, are less known. The key
portion of the doctrinal narrative begins with the infamous SlaughterHouse Cases and continues to its lesser known successor Butchers’
Union.
Decided in 1873, the Slaughter-House Cases marked the first
occasion the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment,

99. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. See Fig.2, supra p.1273; see also supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
Slaughter-House marked the first time the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was interpreted by the Supreme Court. However, the phrase “due process of
law” originates from the Magna Carta and the traditions of interpreting the meaning of due
process extend back much farther than 1868. See infra notes 137–138 (citing pre-1868 sources
that influenced the development of due process doctrine).
102. See, e.g., McCormack, supra note 52, at 403 (“The dissents from Slaughterhouse,
however, would later become the majority in Lochner.”) (footnote omitted); Richard A.
Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 279 (1998) (“[T]he
decisions of the Supreme Court in the Lochner era, for example, made the nineteenth-century
dissents of Justices Joseph Bradley and Stephen Field appear prophetic . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
103. Justice Black’s explanation of the connection remains one of the best. See
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 80–81 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Indeed, Figure 2
tracks his genealogy from Bradley’s dissent in Slaughter-House to Peckham’s majority in
Lochner. Black’s account, however, was skeletal and requires elaboration.
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which passed in 1868.104 Today, the Slaughter-House majority decision
105
The
suffers an atrocious reputation among academics and jurists.
intensity of this criticism, however, tends to obscure the underlying
factual context and specific due process legacy of the case. The
underlying controversies were all civil challenges to the monopoly
conferred by the City of New Orleans upon the Crescent City Live106
The challenged
Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company.
Louisiana legislation responded to genuine public health concerns over
outbreaks of yellow fever and cholera by confining all abattoir
107
operations in New Orleans to a defined subsection of the city. The law
also conferred a monopoly to one company to run the city abattoir, but
permitted any butcher to slaughter meat under the company’s aegis
108
Justice Samuel Miller’s majority opinion
upon payment of a fee.
109
upheld the scheme as a valid exercise of police power. The enduring
controversy over Slaughter-House centers not on this rather reasonable
result, but rather over its doctrinal justification. The main problem
pointed out by the dissenters in Slaughter-House and by modern
commentators is that it effectively obliterated the Privileges or
110
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While the overwhelming bulk of debate in the case turns on the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, it is vital to recall that the Court also
104. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70–71 (1873) (discussing context for
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment). Slaughter-House also involved interpretation of
the Thirteenth Amendment outlawing slavery. See id. at 68–69.
105. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3029–30 (2010)
(collecting sharp and broad-ranging criticism of Slaughter-House).
106. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 57.
107. See id. at 59; see also Jonathan Lurie, Reflections on Justice Samuel F. Miller and the
Slaughter-House Cases: Still a Meaty Subject, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 355, 356 & n.10 (2005)
(describing health epidemics that led to passage of legislation).
108. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 59–60.
109. See id. at 62–63 (discussing relationship between police power and public health
implications of slaughtering animals).
110. The Court interpreted Privileges and Immunities to protect only exclusively federal
rights from state intrusion and defined exclusively federal rights very narrowly. See id. at 96
(Field, J., dissenting) (“If this inhibition . . . only refers, as held by the majority of the court in
their opinion, to such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specially
designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of the United
States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily
excited Congress and the people on its passage.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and
Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 601, 631 n.178 (2001) (“Virtually no serious
modern scholar—left, right, and center—thinks that this [interpretation] is a plausible reading
of the Amendment.”) (quoted in McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030).
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considered whether the monopoly conferred on one company deprived
competing butchers of their liberty or property without due process of
111
law. The majority quickly dismissed the argument, stating that “under
no construction [of the Due Process Clause] that we have ever seen, or
any that we deem admissible” could the monopoly be deemed a
112
deprivation. In his dissent, however, Justice Bradley developed a due
113
process argument based on an economic conception of “liberty.”
After invoking the Magna Carta and “traditionary rights and privileges”
114
Americans inherited from their ancestors, Bradley concluded:
In my view, a law which prohibits a large class of citizens from
adopting a lawful employment, or from following a lawful
employment previously adopted, does deprive them of liberty as
well as property, without due process of law. Their right of
choice is a portion of their liberty; their occupation is their
115
property.
These words provided the textual roots for Lochnerism. However, no
opinion in the strong economic-due-process school ever directly quoted
these words or cited Bradley’s Slaughter-House dissent. Rather,
Bradley’s concept of liberty passed to the next generation through his
subsequent concurrence in Butchers’ Union, which I assert is connected
hermeneutically to his Slaughter-House dissent.
Decided in 1884, Butchers’ Union basically cast the same characters
116
Six years after Slaughterfrom Slaughter-House in reversed roles.
House, the state of Louisiana adopted a new constitution which
117
The previous
abolished its previously conferred abattoir monopoly.
monopoly holders sued, but the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the

111. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 66 (reciting counsel’s argument
that the law deprived the butchers of property without due process of law).
112. Id. at 81.
113. See id. at 114–16 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“This right to choose one’s calling is an
essential part of that liberty which it is the object of government to protect; and a calling,
when chosen, is a man’s property and right.”).
114. Id. at 114–15 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
116. See Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City
Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 746 (1884).
117. Id. at 748.
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state’s right to take away what it had previously granted.118 Justice
Bradley wrote separately to repeat his view that the old monopoly had
never been valid because, inter alia, the law had deprived butchers of
119
Since he wrote in
their liberty to pursue a calling and occupation.
concurrence, Bradley’s Butchers’ Union opinion is represented in Figure
120
2 as lying precisely on the line that separates majority from dissent.
The justification for the hermeneutic link between Bradley’s two
opinions thus derives from the common identity between author,
litigants, subject-matter, and doctrinal themes. This connection seems
hard to deny. As Justice Hugo Black later recognized, Bradley’s due
process analysis in Butchers’ Union “closely followed one phase of the
121
argument of his dissent in the original Slaughter-House cases.”
Unfortunately, a pure citation-counting heuristic would not capture this
connection between Bradley’s Slaughter-House dissent and the rest of
122
the economic due process doctrine. The hermeneutic method does not
suffer from this limitation. And with the connection to Butchers’ Union
established, we can now complete the story of Justice Peckham’s victory
and redemption of Bradley’s dissent.
After Butchers’ Union comes Allgeyer. Decided in 1897, the
underlying case in Allgeyer concerned a civil fine issued against a
company for violating a Louisiana law prohibiting individuals within the
state from making contracts of insurance with corporations doing
123
Writing for a unanimous majority, Peckham
business in New York.
struck down the statute as violating the right of contract guaranteed by
124
He accomplished this impressive feat by
the Due Process Clause.
making two key moves that consolidated a due process tradition that
had previously existed in exile. First, he directly quoted Justice
118. Id. at 754.
119. Id. at 765 (Bradley, J., concurring).
120. I see this position as fairly tracking the precedential value of a concurrence relative
to a majority or dissenting opinion. It lies somewhere in between in a way difficult to define.
121. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 80–81 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The phase
of the argument Black refers to, of course, is the due process analysis.
122. Close analysis of the text of Butchers’ Union reveals that Bradley refers to his
Slaughter-House dissent without actually citing it. See Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 764
(Bradley, J., concurring). After citing the Slaughter-House majority, Bradley states, “I then
held, and still hold . . . .” Id. This oblique reference demonstrates the importance of context
to understanding the relationship between a text and its surrounding tradition. A naked
citation-counting scheme could not account for this subtlety.
123. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1897).
124. Id. at 592–93.

16 - STARGER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

7/9/2012 10:10 PM

EXILE ON MAIN STREET

1285

Bradley’s concurring opinion in Butchers’ Union.125 Here Peckham
explicitly extended remarks Bradley made in the monopoly context to
“describe the rights which are covered by the word ‘liberty’ as contained
126
in the Fourteenth Amendment.” Second, Peckham seized upon dicta
from a case called Powell v. Pennsylvania, in which the Court stated that
“‘the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling . . . is an essential part of
[the] rights of liberty and property, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
127
Though neither Bradley’s concurrence nor Powell’s
Amendment.’”
dicta individually had the force of precedent, Peckham ingeniously
combined the two authorities and established liberty of contract as
Supreme Court doctrine in Allgeyer.
When Lochner came before the Court, Peckham simply grounded
his majority opinion in the authority of his own words in Allgeyer, citing
it for the proposition that “[t]he general right [of an employer] to make
a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty . . . protected
128
Here
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”
Peckham distilled his longer argument from Allgeyer into a concrete
proposition that marked the ascendancy of the strong-right-toeconomic-liberty school. Though the school did not forever grasp the
reins of power, the dexterity of Peckham’s argumentation certainly
made a mark. In his Lochner dissent, Holmes patently ignored Allgeyer.
Although Peckham likely delighted at this omission, the shortcoming in
129
Holmes’ legal argument mattered more in 1905 than it does today.
125. Id. at 589–90 (quoting Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 762, 764, 765 (1884) (Bradley, J.,
concurring)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 590 (quoting Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888)). Powell was an
8–1 decision. Justice Harlan wrote the opinion of the Court and Justice Stephen Field
dissented. The case involved an appeal from a criminal conviction for selling oleomargarine
butter in violation of law a prohibiting non-dairy butter substitutes. See Powell, 127 U.S. at
685. The majority upheld the conviction, a result consistent with the no-strong-right school of
economic due process. Thus, although Peckham in Allgeyer quoted language from Justice
Harlan’s majority opinion, his analysis was far more in line with Justice Stephen Field’s
Powell dissent. Compare id. at 683–87, with id. at 691–92 (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that
liberty under the Due Process Clause means freedom “to follow such pursuits as may be best
adapted to [a person’s] facilities”). The complexity of Peckham’s direct cite to the majority of
a rival school and implied cite to the dissent of an ally explains why Powell does not appear in
Figure 2. Though intriguing, representing the crossed connections would unhelpfully obscure
the essential picture of the strong-right school.
128. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (citing Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589).
129. This is not to say that precedent mattered more in 1905 legal arguments than they
do today. My point is rather that the subsequent redemption of Holmes’ opinion makes the
gaps in his authority seem less important to the modern legal reader. After all, Holmes has
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Figure 3130 depicts both strands of SDP economic liberty doctrine.
As can be seen, the separate lines cross twice. These crossings represent
junctures where one doctrinal school moved from exile in dissent into
the majority. Here, the strong economic liberty strand moved from
dissent in Slaughterhouse to majority in Allgeyer. The contra strand
subsequently moved from dissent in Lochner to majority in West Coast
Hotel. Right in the middle of the movement sits the one case not yet
discussed—Holden. Holmes cited Holden in his Lochner dissent as a
131
recent example of a decision “cutting down the liberty to contract.”
Decided in 1898, a year after Allgeyer, Justice Henry Brown’s majority
opinion in Holden reveals the contemporary doctrinal uncertainty in
132
conflicts between police power and the economic rights of individuals.
Brown candidly acknowledged both that Allgeyer upheld a right of
133
contract and that “many authorities . . . hold that state statues
restricting the hours of labor are unconstitutional.”134 In the end,
however, Justice Brown categorized a law imposing an eight-hour
maximum workday for miners as falling on the “valid exercise of the
135
This result was consistent with
police power” side of the debate.
Slaughterhouse, a case Brown invoked as first establishing the inability
of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit “a proper police regulation
136
for the health and comfort of the people.”
Justice Brown’s evident difficulty in Holden in reconciling conflicting
cases hints at the dialectical role played by competing schools of due
process thought in shaping due process doctrine. Opinions are
arguments and they often respond to arguments made in other opinions.
Sometimes the argument is between majority and dissent in the same
become an authority in his own right. His then-unsupported assertions about the
constitution’s meaning now command more respect than Allgeyer.
130. See infra App., at p.1327.
131. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366 (1898), as one such example).
132. Holden, 169 U.S. at 380. The underlying action was a habeas action challenging the
criminal prosecution initiated against Holden for employing a miner in violation of the eighthour maximum day law. Id. at 366–67.
133. Id. at 391 (discussing Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 591, but concluding that “[t]his right of
contract, however, is itself subject to certain limitations which the State may lawfully impose
in the exercise of its police powers”).
134. Id. at 397–98.
135. Id. at 398 (“We are of the opinion that the act in question was a valid exercise of the
police power of the State . . . .”).
136. Id. at 382 (discussing Slaughter-House).
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case. Sometimes the argument pits majority from one school against
subsequent majority from the competing school. Doctrine ultimately
emerges from this argument dialectic. Dividing doctrine into competing
schools helps picture this dialectic but inevitably oversimplifies the
underlying complexity.
It thus bears repeating that the opinion maps presented here do not
purport to depict the whole of economic due process doctrine. A vast
universe of texts has affected economic due process doctrine—this
137
universe includes the Magna Carta, English opinions from before the
138
139
140
Revolutionary War, state-court opinions, advocates’ briefs, and
141
even non-pictured Supreme Court opinions. And yet, the absence of
these other texts from Figures 1–3 does not detract from the central
claim that uncited dissents played a vital role in shaping economic due
process doctrine. Bradley’s dissent in Slaughter-House and Holmes’
dissent in Lochner articulated the teachings of their rival schools. Even
though neither opinion was cited within the majority opinions that
formally changed the law, these dissents sustained the traditions that
made formal change possible. The real use of Figures 1–3 is to put these
dissents on the maps, record their places in the genealogies, and draw

137. See, e.g., id. at 387–89 (analyzing the discussion of Magna Charta in Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 114–15 (1873)
(Bradley, J., dissenting) (describing Magna Charta as source of “fundamental rights”
protected by due process of law).
138. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 101–04 (Field, J., dissenting)
(dissecting the Case of Monopolies, decided in reign of Queen Elizabeth and reported by
Coke).
139. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63–64 (1905) (collecting state cases
where “courts upheld the right of free contract and the right to purchase and sell labor upon
such terms as the parties may agree to”).
140. In a wonderful article published in 1938, Walton Hamilton compellingly argued that
former Supreme Court justice John Archibald Campbell single-handedly blazed the path for
economic due process when he represented the butchers of New Orleans challenging the
monopoly in Slaughter-House. See Walton H. Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, 48
ETHICS 269, 273–83 (1938). Advocating before the Court where he used to sit, Campbell did
not win Slaughter-House, but as Hamilton points out “the loss of a cause is not the loss of a
doctrine.” Id. at 280. “[A]ll the justices who spoke for the court or in dissent [in SlaughterHouse] addressed themselves to Mr. Campbell’s argument,” id. at 279, and fourteen years
later, the Court followed the path “Mr. Campbell had blazed . . . for a novel doctrine.” Id. at
283 (discussing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
141. See, e.g., supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing influence of Powell v.
Pennsylvania); supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing influence of Harlan’s dissent
in Lochner).
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them into the constellations. Whatever the metaphor, non-cited dissents
forever changed economic due process doctrine.
IV. DUE PROCESS AND INCORPORATION
Substantive due process doctrine is an expansive family tree with
many branches. Though the direct economic liberty line has largely died
out, other branches of the SDP genealogy have survived and
reproduced. Living and generally well-liked relatives to economic
liberty include SDP protections for the rights of individuals to marry
142
those of different races, the rights of parents to direct the upbringing
143
and education of their children, and the rights of individuals to use
144
contraception. More controversial cousins include the right of women
145
to obtain an abortion and the right of same-sex couples to engage in
146
consensual sex. One lesser-known clan in the SDP genealogy is that
147
family of cases that “incorporate”—to use the term of art —rights in
the Bill of Rights into the substantive protections of the Due Process
Clause and apply them against the States. This Part examines the

142. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing a due-process as well as
an equal protection-based right to marry a person of another race).
143. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (vindicating right of
parents to direct education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–403
(1923) (striking down prohibition on teaching foreign languages). The specific connection
between these cases and the Court’s Lochner jurisprudence is explored in Bernstein, supra
note 49, at 301–02.
144. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (right of unmarried couples to use
contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (right of married couples to
use contraception).
145. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
146. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986)). It is noteworthy that Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court
in Lawrence specifically cited and redeemed Justice John Paul Stevens’ dissent in Bowers.
See id. at 578 (“Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers
and should control here.”). Though I do not undertake to examine the role of dissents in
shaping this area of SDP doctrine, the case clearly could be made.
147. Use of “incorporation” to refer to the mechanism of applying an Amendment from
the Bill of Rights against the states through the Due Process Clause emerged in the early
1940s. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461–62 (1942) (“The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the
Sixth Amendment . . . .”). By the time Charles Fairman published his influential law review
article on the topic in 1949, “incorporation” was a bona fide term of art. See Charles
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Original
Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) (arguing against incorporation).
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development of incorporation doctrine and shows how dissents shaped
its competing lines of tradition.
Although incorporation doctrine unquestionably belongs in the SDP
148
it also possesses a peculiar trait that marks it as an
line,
unconventional relative. The distinguishing feature of incorporation
doctrine is its direct connection to constitutional text. Mainline SDP
rights such as those concerning the upbringing of children or sexual
privacy find no specific mention in the Constitution, but derive rather
from reading the Due Process Clause’s guarantee of “liberty” to protect
practices “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [and
149
women].” On the other hand, those rights “incorporated” against the
States through the Due Process Clause necessarily appear directly
somewhere in the Bill of Rights. The apparent contradiction here is
explained by the fact that it has been settled since 1833’s Barron ex rel.
Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore that that the array of liberties secured by
150
the Bill of Rights applied only against the Federal Government.
Incorporation thus refers to the practice of reading the Due Process
Clause’s guarantee of “liberty” to protect against State infringement
certain practices protected against Federal infringement by the Bill of
151
Rights.
Three decades after Barron, the wisdom of exempting the States
from honoring federal rights became an issue again after the bloody
Civil War and passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. At first
blush, the best textual mechanism for applying the Bill of Rights against
the States seemed to be the new amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause, which provided that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United

148. Incorporation’s status as a substantive due process doctrine was accepted by both
sides of the most recent debate. Compare McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020,
3050 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Despite my misgivings about Substantive Due Process as
an original matter, I have acquiesced in the Court’s incorporation of certain guarantees in the
Bill of Rights.”), with id. at 3090 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“This is a substantive due process
case.”). The McDonald case is explored at length infra.
149. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). There are, of course, many other
ways to formulate the substantive due process test. For an interesting (though disapproving)
“collection of the catchwords and catch phrases” in this area, see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511–
12 n.4 (Black, J., dissenting).
150. See Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
151. Incorporation also protects rights to the “life” or “property” guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights.
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States.”152 However, as discussed in the previous Part, the SlaughterHouse majority promptly killed the Clause as a mechanism for enforcing
all but the narrowest set of exclusively national rights against the
153
States. This doctrinal setback did not vanquish the school seeking to
apply the Bill of Rights against the States. Rather, it changed the
textual strategy. Focus soon shifted to the Due Process Clause just one
154
semi-colon to the right of Privileges or Immunities.
This strategy initially failed. In 1884’s Hurtado v. California, an
eight Justice majority led by Justice Stanley Matthews rejected the idea
that the Due Process Clause incorporated the Fifth Amendment’s
155
requirement of indictment by Grand Jury in a capital case. However,
Matthews’ opinion conceded that the Clause protected “the very
substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property” and not just
156
“particular forms of procedure.” And writing in dissent, Justice John
Marshall Harlan made a compelling case for finding that Due Process
Clause should protect those “fundamental principles of liberty and
157
justice” described in the Bill of Rights. From these initial divergences
of opinion were born the competing schools of incorporation doctrine.
The subsequent debate extended over a century and as of today,
158
almost all of the rights in Bill of Rights apply against the States.
Recently, the Court incorporated the Second Amendment in the
159
McDonald case. The story of this remarkable turn-around of the proincorporation school is largely the story of two redeemed dissents—first
of Justice Harlan’s Hurtado dissent and then of Justice Hugo Black’s
160
epic dissent in Adamson v. California. Though these dissents provided
the intellectual ammunition for the cases that redeemed them—Powell
161
162
v. Alabama and Gideon v. Wainwright respectively—neither dissent

152. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
153. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
154. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
155. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1884).
156. See id. at 532. This statement may constitute the earliest reference to the
substantive component of due process in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
157. Id. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
158. For a complete survey of all the rights that have and have not been incorporated,
see McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034–35 nn.12–14 (2010).
159. Id.
160. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
161. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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was directly cited therein. Proving the hermeneutic connection of these
dissents to the tradition embraced in Powell and Gideon is the primary
task of subparts A and B below.
Subpart C examines the genealogy of the school generally opposing
incorporation. This school largely, but not entirely, dominated the
doctrine from Hurtado until the criminal procedure revolution of the
163
When it fell into dissent, the antiWarren Court in the 1960s.
incorporation school found a new champion in the second Justice John
Marshall Harlan (grandson of the first). In his remarkable final dissent
on the Court after a thirty-five year career, Justice Stevens ostensibly
164
At first blush, Stevens’
embraced Harlan’s dissents in McDonald.
embrace seems strange because this anti-incorporation tradition
explicitly rejected expansion of criminal procedure rights that Stevens
himself undoubtedly welcomed. However, a hermeneutic analysis helps
resolve this tension. I argue that Stevens’ dissent should not be read
literally as a defense of the anti-incorporation school but should be
understood instead as a stirring final lecture for future generations on
the proper meaning of substantive due process doctrine writ large.

162. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
163. Given the centrality of criminal procedure cases to the incorporation debate of the
1960s, I have chosen to focus on criminal procedure opinions in my incorporation
genealogies. This means omitting opinions from the 1920s–1940s that applied First
Amendment rights against the states. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(free exercise); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Near v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925) (free speech and press). Though relevant, the secondary importance of these
cases to the story of modern incorporation’s rise does not justify their inclusion in opinion
maps designed to usefully simplify the picture of doctrine.
164. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A. Birth of Modern Incorporation: Redeeming Adamson in Gideon

Figure 4.
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Though the map of incorporation doctrine presented in Figure 4
above is complex, the same principles of interpretation apply as in
simpler economic liberty maps. Beyond the direct claims of citation,
Figure 4 suggests two main arguments: (1) that Justice Black’s dissents
in Adamson and Betts were redeemed by, but not cited in Gideon; and
(2) that Justice Harlan’s dissent in Hurtado was redeemed by, but not
cited in Powell v. Alabama. After presenting the raw genealogical data
for this Figure, I will first consider last Term’s McDonald case to
describe the current understanding of incorporation doctrine, and then
turn to a defense of these two arguments.
Figure 4 depicts the lines connecting opinions in the doctrinal school
generally favoring incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the States.
In chronological order, the opinions in the school are: Harlan in
165
Hurtado v. California (Justice John Marshall Harlan, dissenting, 1884);
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago (Justice
166
Harlan for the Court, 1897); Maxwell v. Dow (Justice Harlan,
167
dissenting, 1900); Twining v. New Jersey (Justice Harlan, dissenting,
168
1908); Powell v. Alabama (Justice George Sutherland for the Court,
1932);169 Betts v. Brady (Justice Hugo Black dissenting, 1942);170
171
Adamson v. California (Justice Black dissenting, 1947); Gideon v.
165. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Hurtado
was an 8–1 decision. Justice Stanley Matthews wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 519.
166. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy was a 7–1 decision. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the
Court. Id. at 228. Chief Justice Melville Fuller took no part in the case. Id. at 263. Justice
David Brewer wrote a solo dissent. Id. at 258.
167. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Maxwell was an
8–1 decision. Justice Rufus Peckham delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 582.
168. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Twining
was an 8–1 decision. Justice William Moody delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 90.
169. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65–68 (1932). Powell was a 7–2 decision. Justice
George Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 49. Justice Pierce Butler
dissented and Justice James McReynolds joined. Id. at 73, 77 (Butler, J., dissenting).
170. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 465, 474 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting). Betts was a 6–3
decision. Justice Owen Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 456. Justice Black
dissented with Justices William Douglas and Frank Murphy joining the dissent. Id. at 474
(Black, J, dissenting).
171. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Adamson was
a 5–4 decision. Justice Stanley Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 47. Justice
Felix Frankfurter wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 59 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Justice Frank Murphy wrote a dissent and Justice Wiley Rutledge joined. Id. at 123 (Murphy,
J., dissenting). Justice Black wrote a separate dissenting opinion and Justice William Douglas
joined in it. Id. at 68, 92 (Black, J., dissenting). Because only Douglas joined Black’s dissent,
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Wainwright (Justice Black for the Court, 1963);172 Malloy v. Hogan
173
(Justice William Brennan for the Court, 1964); Duncan v. Louisiana
174
(Justice Byron White for the Court, 1968); and McDonald v. City of
Chicago (Justice Samuel Alito for the plurality, 2010).175 In genealogical
order, the direct citations in this line are: McDonald (Alito)→ Duncan
176
177
(White); Duncan (White)→ Malloy (Brennan); Malloy (Brennan)→
178
179
Gideon (Black); Gideon (Black)→ Powell v. Alabama (Sutherland);
I record it as receiving two votes.
172. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). Gideon was a 9–0 decision.
Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 336. Justice Douglas wrote a separate
concurring opinion. Id. at 345 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Tom Clark concurred in
result and wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 347 (Clark, J., concurring in result). Justice John
Marshall Harlan (II) concurred and wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 349. (Harlan, J.,
concurring). I record Black’s opinion for the Court as receiving only eight votes in terms of
incorporation because of Justice Harlan’s clear opposition to this point. See id. at 352
(Harlan, J, concurring) (“In what is done today I do not understand the Court . . . to embrace
the concept that the Fourteenth Amendment ‘incorporates’ the Sixth Amendment as such.”).
Given Clark’s vote in Malloy, see infra note 173, it is arguable that the actual incorporation
vote was seven. However, Clark’s Gideon opinion is equivocal enough on incorporation, see
id. at 348 (Clark, J., concurring in result), that I give Black the benefit of his vote.
173. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). Malloy was a 5–4 opinion. Justice William
Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. Justice Douglas joined the opinion of the
Court but also expressed his adherence to his concurrence in Gideon. Id. at 14 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Clark dissented. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Byron White, joined by Justice Potter Stewart, separately dissented. Id. at 33 (White,
J., dissenting).
174. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Duncan was a 7–2 decision. Justice
White delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Potter
Stewart, dissented. Id. at 171 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
175. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (plurality opinion).
McDonald was a 5–4 decision. Justice Alito wrote the plurality opinion for Part II-C, which
concerned incorporation. Id. at 3026 (Part II-C was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts,
Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Anthony Kennedy). Justice Scalia wrote a separate
concurrence. Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Clarence Thomas also wrote a
separate concurrence in which he rejected the plurality’s incorporation theory. Id. at 3058
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice John Paul Stevens
wrote a solo dissent. Id. at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a
separate dissent and was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor. Id.
at 3120 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Because only a plurality voted for incorporation, I categorize
it as falling exactly on the line between majority and dissent. See Fig.4, supra p.1292.
176. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034–36 (repeatedly citing and quoting Duncan).
177. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 (generally citing Malloy); id. at 155 (citing Malloy to
justify overruling “prior dicta” regarding application of Sixth Amendment).
178. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6 (citing Gideon).
179. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932)).
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Adamson (Black)→ Twining (Harlan);180 Betts (Black)→ Twining
181
(Harlan); Powell v. Alabama (Sutherland)→ Chicago, Burlington &
182
Quincy (Harlan); Maxwell (Harlan)→ Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
183
(Harlan); Maxwell (Harlan)→ Hurtado (Harlan).184
Analysis of Justice Samuel Alito’s plurality decision in McDonald
reveals the current self-understanding of the tradition affirming
incorporation. McDonald concerned the reach of the Court’s 2008
District of Columbia v. Heller decision, which held that a District of
Columbia law banning possession of handguns violated the Second
185
Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms. McDonald presented the
question of whether the federal Second Amendment right recognized in
186
Heller applied against the States. The McDonald petitioners advanced
two distinct arguments in favor of incorporation. Quite boldly, their
primary gambit invited the Court to overrule Slaughter-House and find
that the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms is one of the
“‘privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States’” under the
187
Petitioners’ fallback argument advocated
Fourteenth Amendment.
that the Court incorporate the Second Amendment through the Due
188
In the end, a five justice majority sided with
Process Clause.
189
However, in a passionate concurrence, Justice Clarence
petitioners.
Thomas explicitly rejected incorporation through the Due Process
190
Clause and endorsed overruling Slaughter-House. As a result, Alito’s
191
opinion favoring incorporation represented only a four-vote plurality.
180. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 87 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing “the
powerful argument . . . of Mr. Justice Harlan” in his Twining dissent).
181. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474–75 n.1 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing
Harlan’s dissent in Twining). Note that here Black does not single out Harlan by name
though he does cite three of Harlan’s dissents.
182. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932) (citing and discussing Chi., Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).
183. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 614 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Chi.,
Burlington & Quincy, 166 U.S. at 233, 241).
184. Id. at 606 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (recalling his Hurtado dissent and adhering to
views expressed therein).
185. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). Like McDonald, Heller
was a 5–4 decision.
186. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
187. See id. at 3028 (quoting petitioners).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 3026.
190. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I cannot agree that [the Second Amendment]
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Justice Alito’s opinion presents an account of the genealogy of the
pro-incorporation school. Justice Alito divided the history of the
Court’s incorporation jurisprudence into two distinct eras. In Alito’s
genealogy, the Court first considered “whether the Due Process Clause
prohibits the States from infringing rights set out in the Bill of Rights” in
192
193
the late 19th century. This early era had three distinctive features:
(1) the Court sometimes evaluated whether protection was required of a
State by asking “if a civilized system could be imagined that would not
194
accord the particular protection”; (2) the Court frequently held “that a
right set out in the Bill of Rights failed to meet the test for inclusion
195
within the protection of the Due Process Clause”; and (3) even when
the Court found a right from the Bill of Rights fell within due process,
the protection provided against State infringement “sometimes differed
from the protection . . . provided against abridgement by the Federal
196
Government.” On Alito’s telling, these three distinctive early features
all changed in the modern era.
Before describing this modern era, Alito considered the “alternative
theory regarding the relationship between the Bill of Rights and § 1 of
is enforceable against the States through a clause that speak only to ‘process.’ Instead, the
right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.”); see also id. at 3086
(Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting Slaughter-House “insofar as it precludes any overlap
between the privileges and immunities of state and federal citizenship”).
191. See id. at 3026 (Part II-C was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Antonin
Scalia, and Justice Anthony Kennedy).
192. Id. at 3031 (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 516 (1884); Chi., Burlington
& Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)). Note that these first two cases
match up precisely with the genealogy suggested in Figure 4.
193. Alito noted five total features of the era. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031–32.
However, the first three of these features did change in subsequent eras and thus were not
distinctive. See id. at 3034 (noting that decisions of modern era “abandoned three of the
previously noted characteristics of the earlier period”). On Alito’s account, the non-changing
features were that: (1) the Court viewed the due process question as “entirely separate” from
the privilege or immunity question, id. at 3031 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99
(1908)); and (2) the Court protected only those rights “included in the conception of due
process” and “used different formulations in describing the boundaries of due process.” Id. at
3031–32 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
194. Id. at 3032 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)) (internal
quotations omitted). Note that here Alito is quoting a modern case’s summary of the earlier
era in question. It is precisely because Alito is picking up interpretative thread of Duncan
that Figure 4 depicts Duncan as McDonald’s immediate ancestor.
195. Id. (collecting examples).
196. Id. (citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942); and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949)).
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the Fourteenth Amendment . . . championed by Justice Black.”197 Alito
accurately portrays Black as supporting the theory of “total
incorporation”—which held that § 1 made all of the Bill of Rights
198
Although
applicable to the States, effectively overruling Tiernan.
Alito points out that “the Court never has embraced Justice Black’s
‘total incorporation theory,’” he also tellingly observes that “the Court
eventually moved in that direction by initiating what has been called a
199
Critically for our purposes,
process of ‘selective incorporation.’”
Alito’s observation directly acknowledges the role of Black’s dissents in
shaping the change in incorporation doctrine between its early and
modern eras.
Before separately analyzing the impact of Black’s dissents, we need
to complete our account of Alito’s genealogy. After acknowledging
Black, Alito turned to the modern era of “selective incorporation,”
where the Court held that the Due Process Clause fully incorporates
200
Selective
particular rights contained in the first eight Amendments.
incorporation, per Alito, rejected the three distinctive features of the
early era. First, the Court “made it clear that the governing standard is
not whether any ‘civilized system [can] be imagined’” without a
particular Bill of Rights guarantee, but rather whether the right “is
201
fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.”
Second, the Court abandoned its earlier distinctive habit of finding that
a right set out in the Bill of Rights failed to meet the test of inclusion
and “eventually incorporated almost all of the provisions of the Bill of
202
Finally, selective incorporation also “decisively held that
Rights.”
incorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced against

197. Id. at 3032–33.
198. Id. at 3033 (citing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 72 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting)). In consecutive footnotes, Justice Alito summarizes the evidence for and against
Black’s total incorporation theory. See id. at 3033 nn.9–10. In the end, however, Alito
“take[s] no position with respect to this academic debate.” Id. at 3033 n.10. Following the
good Justice’s wise lead, neither will I venture into such perilous waters.
199. Id. at 3033–34 (collecting cases).
200. Id. at 3034.
201. Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 n.14 (1968)) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Id. at 3034. In two useful footnotes, Alito describes all the rights that have been
incorporated, id. at 3034 n.12, as well as those few Bill of Rights protections that remain
unincorporated. Id. at 3035 n.13.
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the States . . . according to the same standards that protect those
203
personal rights against federal encroachment.’”
The touchstone case in Alito’s genealogy is Duncan. Duncan
provides for Alito the ultimate standard for incorporation—whether a
Bill of Right protection “is fundamental to our scheme of ordered
204
liberty.” In Alito’s view, this standard is synonymous with an inquiry
into whether a Bill of Right is “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
205
and tradition.’” Of course, Justice Alito subsequently concluded that
the right to keep and bear arms was deeply rooted in the Nation’s
206
history and tradition. The Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms, as interpreted by Heller, was therefore incorporated against the
207
States. The particulars of the heated contest over competing traditions
208
of firearm ownership and regulation need not detain us. Rather, what
is important to recognize is that Alito’s account of incorporation
doctrine writ large itself grows out of a particular tradition—last
articulated by Justice Byron White in Duncan.
Figure 4 therefore draws an arrow back from Alito’s opinion in
209
McDonald to White’s opinion in Duncan. Duncan, in turn, explicitly
relied upon and extended the selective incorporation approach of
210
Justice William Brennan, generally considered the primary
Malloy.
203. Id. at 3035 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964)). In a footnote, Justice
Alito recognized “one exception to this general rule” that “incorporated Bill of Rights
protections apply identically to the States and the Federal Government”—the Sixth
Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials, but not in state
criminal trials. See id. at 3035 n.14 (discussing Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972);
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)). Alito characterizes this as an anomaly
attributable to “an unusual division among the Justices.” Id.
204. Id. at 3036 (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149).
205. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
206. See id. at 3036 (“Heller makes it clear that this [Second Amendment] right is
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721)).
207. Id. at 3050 (“We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”).
208. Justice Breyer highlighted the continuing academic debate over the historical right
to keep and bear arms in his dissent. See id. at 3121 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (collecting law
review articles and citing an amici brief filed by historians). Justice Alito quickly dismissed
these arguments. Id. at 3048 (“[W]hile there is certainly room for disagreement about
Heller’s analysis of the history of the right to keep and bear arms, nothing written since Heller
persuades us to reopen the question there decided.”).
209. See Fig.4, supra p.1292; supra note 176 and accompanying text.
210. See Fig.4, supra p.1292; supra note 177. The specific proposition that Duncan
represented a victory for selective incorporation (as opposed to total incorporation) was
directly conceded by Justice Black. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 164 (1968) (Black,
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architect of selective incorporation, wrote the majority opinion in
211
Malloy. In Malloy, Brennan cited back to Gideon as the most recent
212
example of the Court’s incorporation jurisprudence. It is important to
notice that the arrows connecting McDonald to Gideon only link
opinions accepted by a majority of the Court.
The modern
incorporation doctrine described by Alito in McDonald was put on the
213
doctrinal map by Gideon. After Gideon, the Court handed down an
incredible series of cases overruling established precedent that had
denied state criminal defendants the same protections granted their
214
These overrulings helped define the Warren
federal counterparts.
Court revolution in criminal procedure. Gideon thus represents a
critical turning point in modern incorporation doctrine.
Though Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in Gideon, he did
not cite to his earlier dissents where he introduced his incorporation
theory. One proposition asserted in Figure 4 is that Black’s Gideon
opinion nonetheless redeemed his prior dissents in Betts and then
Adamson. To prove this, consider first that Betts concerned an indigent
defendant facing robbery charges who had requested the appointment

J., concurring) (“I am very happy to support this selective process through which our Court
has since the Adamson case held most of the specific Bill of Rights’ protections applicable to
the States to the same extent they are applicable to the Federal Government.”).
211. See Fig.4, supra p.1292; see also supra note 173; Louis Henkin, “Selective
Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 74 n.1 (1963) (describing
selective incorporation as “the Brennan doctrine”).
212. See Fig.4, supra p.1292; supra note 178 and accompanying text.
213. It could be argued that Mapp v. Ohio, a case that preceded Gideon by almost two
years actually represented the first salvo in the incorporation revolution of the 1960s. See 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)). After all, Justice Brennan
relied heavily on Mapp in Malloy. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (analyzing
Mapp). However, the role of incorporation theory in Mapp is unclear. Certainly, Justice
Clark did not allude to a theory of incorporation in his majority opinion, which applied the
federal exclusionary rule to the states. By contrast, incorporation was front and center in
Gideon both because of Black’s fame as a proponent of that view and because of Douglas’
concurrence. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345–47 (Douglas, J., concurring).
What’s more, Clark later clearly sided with Harlan in the campaign against incorporation.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text. Thus, despite Brennan’s reading of Mapp in
Malloy, I submit that Mapp did not establish the arrival of incorporation in the majority
nearly as clearly as did Gideon.
214. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (overruling Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 154 (abrogating Maxwell v. Dow, 176
U.S. 581 (1900); and Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)); Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6
(1964) (overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); and Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947)). Justice Black sided with the majority in all these cases.
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of counsel.215 After denial of this request, defendant was convicted and
216
In the Betts majority
subsequently brought a federal habeas action.
opinion, Justice Owen Roberts held that while the Sixth Amendment
217
required appointment of counsel to indigents in federal court, “the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as
218
such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment.” Justice
Black dissented in Betts, briefly alluding to his concept of incorporation:
“I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth applicable to
the states. But this view, although often urged in dissents, has never
219
been accepted by a majority of this Court . . . .” Black urged that the
“fundamental” due process right to counsel in capital cases recognized
in Powell v. Alabama should extend to all proceedings involving poor
220
people facing “charges of serious crime[s].”
One the most important criminal procedure cases in Supreme Court
221
Now writing for the
history, Gideon expressly overruled Betts.
majority, Black held that “in our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
222
As he had
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”
done in Betts, Black directly invoked Powell v. Alabama to support his
223
argument that the indigent’s right to counsel was fundamental. This
parity of reasoning and authority in argument, as well as literal reversal
of result, confirm that Gideon effectively redeemed Black’s Betts
dissent. Black’s failure to cite his own previous dissent does not weaken
this conclusion. Instead, the lack of citation provides more evidence
that a pure citation-based method of evaluating influence is inadequate.

215. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 456–57 (1942).
216. Id. at 457.
217. Id. at 465–66 & n.14 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
218. Id. at 461–62 & n.10 (citing, inter alia, Hurtado, Maxwell, Twining, Snyder, and
Palko). Compare id., with Fig.5, infra p.1311.
219. Id. 316 U.S. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In a
footnote, Black cites to the first Justice Harlan’s dissents (although not using Harlan’s name)
in Twining and Maxwell to support his incorporation proposition. Id. at 474–75 n.1.
220. Id. at 475–76 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
221. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (overruling Betts). The enduring
importance of Gideon is that its recognition of a fundamental right to counsel led directly to
the creation and proliferation of public defender systems across the nation.
222. Id. at 344.
223. Id. at 344–45 (quoting the “moving words of Justice Sutherland in Powell v.
Alabama”).
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Yet our non-citation based account of the development of
incorporation doctrine would be similarly inadequate if it rested solely
on the connection between Betts and Gideon. As seen in Figure 4, in
between Betts and Gideon came Adamson. It was in his magisterial
Adamson dissent that Justice Black offered his full-throated defense of
incorporation that later proved so influential. Decided in 1947,
Adamson concerned a death-sentenced defendant who had declined to
224
testify at his murder trial. The prosecutor commented negatively upon
this silence, which the defendant argued violated the privilege against
225
self-incrimination. Writing for the majority, Justice Stanley Reed held
that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination did not
apply to the states, affirming the line of cases beginning with Hurtado in
226
1884 and including 1905’s Twining. Black famously dissented, filling
the reporters with 24 pages of historical analysis and a 31 page
227
In so doing, Black declared his allegiance to a prior
appendix.
tradition of “vigorous dissents that have been written in almost every
228
case where the Twining and Hurtado doctrines have been applied.”
As Justice Alito later recognized in McDonald, the theory of “total
incorporation” advanced by Black in his Adamson dissent never quite
229
However, Black sparked an
prevailed in the Court’s jurisprudence.
intense debate and defended a radical position that created space for an
230
The incorporation discourse after Adamson
eventual compromise.
certainly took twists and turns before Black’s particular dream of total
incorporation succumbed to the reality of selective incorporation. By
the time of Gideon in 1963, the vibrant constitutional conversation
featured many voices and Figure 4 could just as easily show other

224. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 48–49 (1947).
225. See id.
226. See id. at 54 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)). Although Justice
Reed’s opinion for the Court did not specifically invoke Hurtado, Justice Frankfurter’s
concurrence did. See id. at 65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516 (1884), as a “great opinion[]” part of the “heritage of the past”).
227. See generally id. at 68–123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 84 (Black, J., dissenting). In this passage, Black is specifically referring to
cases where the Twining and Hurtado doctrines were employed to strike down state
regulatory laws. Id. The dissents cited here include many of those featured in Figure 1.
Compare id. at 83 n.12, with Fig.1, supra p.1258.
229. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
230. For a useful summary of the debate sparked by Black, see McDonald v. City of
Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3033 nn.9–10 (2010).
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opinions to the path from Adamson to Gideon.231 Yet additional data
points would not undermine the basic picture of Black’s impressive
doctrinal influence over the modern era. The essential tradition of
strong incorporation championed by Black in Betts and Adamson fairly
well prevailed in Gideon, was followed in Malloy and Duncan, and was
adhered to in McDonald.
B. Early Era Triumph: Redeeming Harlan (I) in Powell v. Alabama

Figure 4.1.

When Black advanced his theory of incorporation in Betts and
Adamson, he relied on two seemingly distinct lines of authority. First,
he invoked a line where Court majorities had found due process
protection for rights contained in the Bill of Rights—most pertinently
1932’s Powell v. Alabama and 1897’s Chicago, Burlington & Quincy.
231. For example, an even more detailed map would include earlier dissents by Justice
Brennan that articulated his selective incorporation theory. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263, 263 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154
(1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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This particular majority line, however, did not stand alone and had been
limited and restricted by anti-incorporation majority opinions in
232
Thus, Black
criminal procedure cases in the Hurtado–Twining line.
also invoked a second line of authority—though not precedential—to
support his incorporation argument. That second line was constituted
by “vigorous dissents” in the Hurtado–Twining line, most especially the
233
“powerful argument in the dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan.”
Singling out Justice Harlan for praise made perfect sense since his
dissenting opinions in Hurtado, Maxwell, and Twining constitute the
earliest defenses of incorporation under the Due Process Clause. What
most commentators overlook, however, is that Justice Harlan also wrote
the majority opinion in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, the Court’s
234
earliest incorporation case. Harlan’s under-the-radar achievement in
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy gave the pro-incorporation school an
invaluable toehold in legitimate precedent. Remarkably, this toehold
helped justify the historic decision in Powell v. Alabama, which
recognized a due process right to counsel in capital cases enforceable
235
against the states. Powell marked the first time a criminal procedure
right was incorporated and signaled the redemption of Harlan’s Hurtado
dissent. Thus, both of Black’s ostensibly distinct lines of supporting
authority in Adamson ultimately derived from the same tradition
initiated by Justice Harlan in dissent.
Once again, establishing the genealogical connections to prove this
claim requires more than attention to citation. To grasp the full story,
we must begin with the majority opinion in Hurtado and show how it set
up an interpretative paradigm that would have made incorporation
impossible. Then we turn to Harlan’s attack on this paradigm, its
232. See supra note 226. The Hurtado–Twining line effectively limited Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy. As explored infra pp. 1315–17, the reach of Powell v. Alabama was
limited by Snyder and Palko.
233. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 47, 84, 87 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Here
Black is specifically referring to Harlan’s Twining dissent. In his Appendix, however, Black
also cited the “vigorous dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan” in Hurtado, Maxwell, and
Twining. Id. at 123.
234. That Chicago, Burlington & Quincy qualifies as the Court’s first due process
incorporation case is uncontroversial. See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct at 3035 n.12 (noting that
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy is the earliest incorporation case listed in footnote cataloging
all incorporation decisions); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99
YALE L.J. 637, 653 (1989). Of course, not all scholars overlook Harlan’s role in Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy. See, e.g., Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the
Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1503 (2000).
235. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1932).

16 - STARGER (DO NOT DELETE)

1304

7/9/2012 10:10 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[95:1253

apparent success in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, and its partial
redemption in Powell v. Alabama.
Decided in 1884, Hurtado concerned the prosecution of a capital
murder case based solely upon an information filed by the district
236
attorney without presentment or indictment before a grand jury. The
Fifth Amendment clearly prohibited this practice federally and so the
question became whether the prohibition would apply against the States
237
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice
Stanley Matthews’ majority opinion is a classic exposition of due
process. After a scholarly survey of the concept from the Magna Carta
to the current day, Matthews posited due process as an evolving
understanding responsive to “new and various experiences of our own
238
situation.” In what became an enduring formulation, Matthews finally
described due process as “th[e] law of the land in each State . . . exerted
within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
239
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.” Though
Matthews’ rhetoric promoted vigorous protection of individual rights,
he nonetheless concluded that indictment by grand jury was not a
240
Hurtado lost; his death
necessary requirement of due process.
sentence was affirmed.
Matthews justified this result without reference to the extensive
241
Instead, he reasoned by a
precedent or history he had surveyed.
painfully simple syllogism. For his major premise, Matthews stated,
“According to a recognized canon of interpretation . . . we are forbidden
to assume, without clear reason to the contrary, that any part of [the
242
Fifth] amendment is superfluous.” For his minor premise, Matthews
pointed out that the phrase “due process of law” appears alongside the
236. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 520 (1884).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 531. For Matthews’ survey of the historical meanings of due process, see id.
at 521–30.
239. Id. at 535. The Court immediately picked up on this formulation and continues to
use it to this day. See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 32 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that Hurtado introduced “‘fundamental
justice’ [to] the due process lexicon”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 102 (1908).
240. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 534–35, 538.
241. Matthews’ historical survey and analysis of precedent unfolds over thirteen pages of
the U.S. Reporter. See id. at 521–34. His syllogism occurs over a single page and cites no
authority whatsoever. See id. at 534.
242. Id.
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Fifth’s Amendment’s “specific and express provision for perpetuating
243
the institution of the grand jury.” From these premises, the “natural
and obvious inference is, that in the sense of the Constitution, ‘due
process of law’ was not meant or intended to include, ex vi termini, the
244
institution and procedure of a grand jury.” Finally, Matthews added
that if it had been part of the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
“to perpetuate the institution of the grand jury in all the States, it would
have embodied, as did the Fifth Amendment, express declarations to
245
that effect.”
In dissent, Justice Harlan bristled at Matthews’ deduction. “This line
of argument,” stated Harlan, “would lead to results which are
246
inconsistent with the vital principles of republican government.”
Harlan reasoned that if the presence of “due process” along-side a
specific provision for grand juries in capital cases in the Fifth
Amendment necessarily meant that grand juries were excluded from
due process, then
inexorable logic would require it to be, likewise, held that the
right not to be put twice in jeopardy of life and limb for the same
offence, nor compelled in a criminal case to testify against one’s
self—rights and immunities also specifically recognized in the
Fifth Amendment—were not protected by that due process of
247
law . . . .
Harlan further argued that the same “inexorable logic” would also
exclude from due process “the right of persons to just compensation for
private property taken for public use,” the rights of the accused secured
under the Sixth Amendment, and even the right to a petit jury.248 In
other words, the majority’s logic would prevent all incorporation claims.
According to Harlan, this unjust implication of Matthews’ syllogism
both invalidated the logic and contradicted the idea that due process
249
protected “fundamental principles of liberty and justice.” Instead of
employing the canon assuming no superfluous language, Harlan urged
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 547 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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that the provision of due process of law constituted an additional layer
250
of protection for liberty and property. On his reading, this additional
protection included the right to a grand jury indictment in capital
251
cases.
Thirteen years later, the Court confronted a question that Harlan
had specifically identified as one answered by the Hurtado majority’s
“inexorable logic.” Decided in 1897, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
concerned whether a railroad company was entitled under the Due
Process Clause to “just compensation” for private property taken for
252
public use. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court, which
held that due process prohibits States from taking private property for
253
public use without just compensation. This result flew in the face of
the no-superfluous-language reasoning in Hurtado since the Takings
Clause also appears along-side the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
254
Given this, and despite its obvious relevance, it perhaps
Clause.
comes as no surprise that Harlan in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
255
utterly failed to cite to Hurtado.
Yet Harlan’s Chicago, Burlington & Quincy opinion evidently
attacked the Hurtado majority sub silentio. Harlan argued for an
expansive, substantive conception of due process, emphasizing that “[i]n
determining what is due process of law regard must be had to substance,
256
Just as his prior dissent had described grand jury
not to form.”
257
indictment in capital cases as a fundamental principle of liberty,
250. Id. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 550–51 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329
(1857)). In Robbins, Chief Justice Shaw of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
confronted whether due process of law included indictment by grand jury and concluded that
it did. See id.
252. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233 (1897).
253. Id. at 241 (“In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by
statute, whereby private property is taken for the State or under its direction for public use,
without compensation made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority,
wanting in the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). Although
Harlan vindicated the due process principle, his opinion nonetheless held that the one dollar
nominal compensation paid the railroad company was “just compensation.” See id. at 257–58.
Writing in dissent, Justice Brewer agreed with the general due process principle, but opined
that the nominal compensation did not meet due process standards. Id. at 259 (Brewer, J.,
dissenting).
254. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
255. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy, 166 U.S. at 228–58.
256. Id. at 235.
257. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 558 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Harlan’s later opinion characterized protection of property rights as “a
258
vital principle of republican institutions.” In both cases, Harlan found
the justification for due process protection under the Fourteenth
259
Amendment in longstanding traditions honoring the practice at issue.
This analytical resonance as well as the obvious identity of author and
doctrinal result explains the hermeneutic connection between the two
opinions posited in Figure 4.
Harlan’s success in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy in quietly pushing
his Hurtado analysis in the takings realm did not extend to criminal
procedure cases. In 1900, the Court held in Maxwell that a petit jury
composed of eight people did not violate due process despite the Sixth
260
The majority primarily
Amendment’s requirement of twelve jurors.
261
relied on Hurtado to justify its decision. Harlan dissented, relying on
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy as authority and also citing his own
262
Hurtado dissent. Eight years later in Twining, the Court ruled that the
privilege against self-incrimination did not apply in state prosecutions
263
Harlan again dissented.264
and again relied, in part, on Hurtado.
Although this time Harlan did not directly cite to his own prior
opinions, he nonetheless advanced his traditional arguments in favor of
265
incorporation.

258. Chi., Burlington & Quincy, 166 U.S. at 235–36.
259. Compare id. at 235–41, with Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 550–57 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The tradition of grand jury indictments in capital cases extends back to the Magna Charta and
appears older than the tradition of just compensation for takings.
260. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602–03 (1900).
261. Id. at 603 (“Trial by jury has never been affirmed to be a necessary requisite of due
process of law. In not one of the cases cited and commented upon in the Hurtado case is a
trial by jury mentioned as a necessary part of such process.”).
262. See id. at 614 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, 166 U.S.
at 233)); id. at 606 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (recalling his Hurtado dissent and adhering to views
expressed therein).
263. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908) (citing Hurtado, 110 U.S. at
528); see also id. at 106 (“The power of the people of the States to make and alter their laws at
pleasure is the greatest security for liberty and justice, this court has said in Hurtado.”
(citation omitted)).
264. See id. at 114 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
265. The absence of direct citation explains why the arrow in Figure 4 connecting
Harlan’s Twining dissent to his prior Maxwell dissent is dotted. In Twining, Harlan
emphasized self-incrimination as a privilege or immunity of national citizenship. See, e.g., id.
at 122 (Harlan, J., dissenting). However, he nonetheless adopted the essential position that
the Fourteenth Amendment, by due process or privileges and immunities, incorporated the
Bill of Rights against the states:
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This brings us at last to Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court’s
266
1932 decision in the infamous Scottsboro Boys case. The young black
defendants in Powell stood convicted of raping two white girls and faced
267
Before the Court, the defendants generally argued
death sentences.
that the proceedings below suffered from profound prejudice and
intimidation. Their legal claim was that they had been denied the
268
assistance of counsel and that this violated due process of law. This
squarely presented the doctrinal question of “whether the denial of the
assistance of counsel contravenes the due process clause of the
269
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.”
Writing for a seven-justice majority, Justice George Sutherland first
considered the facts. The trial court proceedings took place in “an
atmosphere of tense, hostile and excited public sentiment,” wrote
270
Although counsel was eventually assigned hours before
Sutherland.
trial, the appointment was “little more than an expansive gesture” such
that “[u]nder the circumstances disclosed . . . defendants were not
271
accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense.” Turning to the
Fourteenth Amendment question, Sutherland proposed to test
“whether due process of law has been accorded in given instances” by
looking to English “settled usages and modes of proceeding . . . before
the Declaration of Independence” so long as those settled usages and
modes suited “the civil and political conditions of our ancestors by
272
having been followed in this country after it became a nation.” Under

The privileges and immunities mentioned in the original Amendments, and
universally regarded as our heritage of liberty and from the common law, were thus
secured [by the Fourteenth Amendment] to every citizen of the United States . . .
and due process of law, in all public proceedings affecting life, liberty or property,
were enjoined equally upon the Nation and the States.
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
266. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Of course, the profound racial and regional
divisions exposed by the Scottsboro Boys episode implicate discourses and institutions well
beyond incorporation and the Supreme Court. See, e.g., N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park
Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315,
1321–25, 1335 (2004).
267. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 49–50.
268. See id. at 50.
269. Id. at 60.
270. Id. at 51.
271. Id. at 56, 58.
272. Id. at 65 (citing Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81, 85 (1896)).
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this test, held Sutherland, due process “has not been met in the present
273
case.”
Critically, Sutherland did not end his analysis there. He continued:
“We do not overlook . . . Hurtado, where this court determined that due
process of law does not require an indictment by a grand jury as a
274
Sutherland then
prerequisite to prosecution by a state for murder.”
quoted Justice Matthews’ entire Hurtado syllogism that excluded grandjury indictment from due process under the canon precluding
275
superfluous language. Since the Sixth Amendment explicitly provides
for the assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions, conceded
Sutherland:
In the face of the reasoning of the Hurtado case, if it stood alone,
it would be difficult to justify the conclusion that the right to
counsel, being thus specifically granted by the Sixth
Amendment, was also within the intendment of the due process
of law clause. But the Hurtado case does not stand alone. In the
later case of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Chicago,
this court held that . . . private property . . . taken for public use
without just compensation, was in violation of the due process of
law required by the Fourteenth Amendment, notwithstanding
that the Fifth Amendment explicitly declares that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
276
compensation.
After surveying cases that followed Chicago, Burlington & Quincy,
Sutherland concluded that “[t]hese later cases establish that
notwithstanding the sweeping character of the language in the Hurtado
case, the rule laid down is not without exceptions.”277 This conclusion
signaled the redemption of Harlan’s Hurtado dissent as the Hurtado

273. Id.
274. Id. (citation omitted).
275. Id. at 65–66 (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1884)). See also
supra notes 242–245 and accompanying text.
276. Id. at 66 (citation omitted).
277. Id. at 67. The cases surveyed all essentially incorporated against the states via due
process First Amendment speech and press liberties. See id. (citing Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925)). The place of these cases in our incorporation story is discussed supra note 163.
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majority’s “inexorable logic” has since played no part in incorporation
278
jurisprudence.
It bears repeating that Harlan’s redemption here occurred without
citation to his dissent. And while Sutherland did plainly rely on
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, he followed the usual convention of
referring to the holding of “the Court” and did not mention Harlan as
the author of that critical opinion. Yet Harlan’s authority undeniably
plays a starring role in Powell v. Alabama’s doctrinal story. This
demonstrates the profoundly inter-textual nature of doctrine: the
meaning of a single opinion cannot be understood by parsing that single
text alone. Thus Justice Black’s subsequent citation to Powell v.
Alabama in Gideon must also be understood as invoking an entire
tradition of dissents beginning with Harlan in Hurtado and continuing
through to Black’s own dissents in Betts and Adamson. These dissents
kept alive the dream of applying the Bill of Rights against the States and
provided the intellectual ammunition for maintaining this dream. They
helped construct the context for an evolving tradition supporting
incorporation.

278. The redemption is partial since the Hurtado holding that grand jury indictment is
not required in state prosecutions has never been overruled. See McDonald v. City of
Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct 3020, 3035 n.13 (2010)).
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C. Fighting for the Future: Stevens’ Strange McDonald Dissent

Figure 5.

The tradition generally opposed to incorporation is represented in
Figure 5 above. Note that all the connections rendered are directly
supported by citation. My thesis that uncited dissents influence
doctrine, therefore, cannot be advanced through study of this map.
However, a brief survey of the territory not yet explored is necessary to
complete the doctrinal story of incorporation. In addition, analysis of
Justice Stevens’ final dissent for the Court in McDonald reveals the
deeper connection between incorporation and SDP doctrine writ large.
To these two tasks I turn after laying out the genealogical data behind
Figure 5.
In chronological order, the opinions in Figure 5 are: Hurtado v.
279
California (Justice Stanley Matthews for the Court, 1884); Twining v.
New Jersey (Justice William Moody for the Court, 1908);280 Snyder v.

279. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516. For vote break-down, see supra note 165
and accompanying text.
280. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). For vote break-down, see supra note
168 and accompanying text.
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Massachusetts (Justice Benjamin Cardozo for the Court, 1934);281 Palko
282
v. Connecticut (Justice Cardozo for the Court, 1937); Betts v. Brady
283
(Justice Owen Roberts for the Court, 1942); Adamson v. California
284
(Justice Stanley Reed for the Court, 1947); Malloy v. Hogan (Justice
285
John Marshall Harlan dissenting, 1964); Duncan v. Louisiana (Justice
286
Harlan dissenting, 1968); McDonald v. City of Chicago (Justice John
287
In genealogical order, the direct
Paul Stevens dissenting, 2010).
citations in this line are: McDonald (Stevens)→ Duncan (Harlan);288
289
Malloy (Harlan)→ Palko
Duncan (Harlan)→ Malloy (Harlan);
290
291
(Cardozo); Adamson (Reed)→ Palko (Cardozo); Betts (Roberts)→
292
Palko (Cardozo); Palko (Cardozo)→ Snyder (Cardozo);293 Snyder

281. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). Snyder was a 5–4 decision. Justice
Cardozo delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 102. Justice Owen Roberts dissented, and
Justices Brandeis, Sutherland, and Butler concurred in his opinion. Id. at 123, 138 (Roberts,
J., dissenting).
282. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Palko was an 8–1 decision. Justice
Cardozo delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 320. Justice Butler dissented without
opinion. Id. at 329.
283. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 465 (1942). For vote break-down, see supra note 170 and
accompanying text.
284. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). For vote break-down, see supra note
171 and accompanying text.
285. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For vote breakdown, see supra note 173 and accompanying text.
286. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For vote
break-down, see supra note 174 and accompanying text.
287. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3088 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). For vote break-down, see supra note 175 and accompanying text.
288. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3095, 3098 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Harlan’s dissent
in Duncan). Stevens also repeatedly cites to other Harlan dissents that sound similar themes,
including Malloy. Id. at 3092.
289. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 172, 173 & n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that “I have
raised my voice many times before against the Court’s continuing undiscriminating insistence
upon fastening on the States federal notions of criminal justice” and citing his own dissent in
Malloy).
290. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 21 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is equally plain that the line of
cases exemplified by Palko . . . furnishes no general theoretical framework for what the Court
does today.” (citation omitted)).
291. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947) (“We reaffirm the conclusion of the
Twining and Palko cases that protection against self-incrimination is not a privilege or
immunity of national citizenship.”); see also id. at 62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (singling out
Cardozo and Palko for praise).
292. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461–62 & n.10 (1942) (“The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate . . . the Sixth Amendment . . . .” (footnote
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(Cardozo)→ Twining (Moody);294 Snyder (Cardozo)→ Hurtado
295
296
(Matthews); Twining (Moody)→ Hurtado (Matthews).
Recall the conclusions from the previous subsection that (a) Powell
v. Alabama redeemed Harlan’s dissent in Hurtado; and that (b) Black’s
subsequent invocation of Powell in Gideon was hermeneutically
connected to the dissenting tradition that extended from Harlan to
Black’s own dissents in Betts and Adamson. These conclusions beg the
question as to how the pro-incorporation school ended up in dissent in
Betts and Adamson after its apparent victory in Powell. The answer to
this question lies in an analysis of two highly influential opinions by
Justice Benjamin Cardozo—1934’s Snyder and 1937’s Palko. In these
tradition-defining opinions, Cardozo specifically sought to reclaim the
doctrine of Hurtado and Twining that had been imperiled by Powell.
Decided in 1934, Snyder considered whether a due process
confrontation right was violated by the denial of a criminal defendant’s
request to accompany the jury to a crime-scene visit initiated by the
297
prosecution. Over strong dissent, Cardozo classified the crime-scene
visit as a “view,” held that the absence of a defendant at a view did not
contravene any “immutable principles of justice” required by the
298
Cardozo
Fourteenth Amendment, and affirmed the death sentence.
concluded his Snyder opinion with a stern warning against excessive
liberalism in criminal procedure:

omitted) (citing Palko among other cases)).
293. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder for the proposition
that due process protects “‘principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental’”).
294. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (citing Twining for the proposition
that due process only protects principles of justice deeply rooted in tradition).
295. Id. (citing Hurtado for proposition that due process only protects principles of
justice deeply rooted in tradition).
296. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908) (discussing Justice Matthews’
opinion in Hurtado).
297. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 103–05.
298. See id. at 122. Cardozo somewhat fudged the Sixth Amendment incorporation
issue presented in this case. On the one hand, he identified the Sixth Amendment privilege of
confronting one’s accusers and cross-examining them and “assume[d] that the privilege is
reinforced by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 106. On the other hand, he intimated that
a federal court might find a Sixth Amendment violation on the facts presented, id. at 116, but
found no due process violation. Id. at 117. Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion made clear the
view that the Sixth Amendment privilege had been violated and that this privilege should
inhere in the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 128–32 (Roberts, J., dissenting). For more
on Roberts’ important dissent, see infra Part V.
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There is danger that the criminal law will be brought into
contempt—that discredit will even touch the great immunities
assured by the Fourteenth Amendment—if gossamer
possibilities of prejudice to a defendant are to nullify a sentence
pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction in obedience to
299
local law, and set the guilty free.
With this call to respect local variations in state procedural practices,
Cardozo explicitly sought to prevent the Court from “travel[ling] far
away from the doctrine of Hurtado v. California and Twining v. New
300
Jersey.” Of course, it was precisely the Hurtado doctrine (if not also
Twining) that Justice Sutherland’s majority opinion in Powell v.
301
Alabama had undermined just two years prior to Snyder.
Three years later, Palko picked up where Snyder left off. This time,
instead of five votes, Justice Cardozo commanded eight. Palko affirmed
a Connecticut man’s death sentence after he had twice been tried for
302
After the first trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of
murder.
303
murder in the second degree and imposed a life sentence. The state
appealed, won a reversal, tried the defendant a second time, and secured
304
Under federal law, this would have constituted
a death sentence.
305
Cardozo
double jeopardy prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.
nonetheless held the practice afforded the defendant due process based
on a simple principle of “symmetry”—since the defendant would be
306
allowed an appeal of error, so too should the State. Together with his
opinion in Snyder, Palko took the wind out of Powell’s incorporation
sails and set precedent against giving criminal defendants the rigorous
307
procedural protections recognized in the Bill of Rights.

text.

299. Id. at 122.
300. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
301. On Powell’s abrogation of Hurtado, see supra notes 277–278 and accompanying

302. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 320–21, 329 (1937).
303. Id. at 321.
304. Id. at 321–22.
305. See id. at 322–23 (citing Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904)).
306. Id. at 328.
307. Cardozo’s strategy did not go unnoticed by the Snyder dissents that quoted Powell’s
analysis of Hurtado at length. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 133–35 (1934)
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting Powell).
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The story of how Justice Black subsequently overcame Cardozo’s
reaction through a pro-incorporation campaign initiated in his Betts and
Adamson dissents has already been told. As emphasized, Black found
authority and inspiration for his campaign in the opinions of the first
Justice Harlan. It is a great genealogical irony then that the second
Justice Harlan provided the staunchest resistance to Black’s
incorporation project. Though they both campaigned in dissent, Harlan
the grandson championed the opposite cause of Harlan the grandfather.
Importantly though, the contours of the incorporation debate had
changed between generations. Harlan II did not flatly oppose all
applications of the Bill of Rights against the States nor did he try to
resurrect Matthews’ logic from Hurtado. Rather, as Justice Alito put it
in McDonald, Harlan “fought a determined rearguard action to preserve
308
This two-track approach
the two-track approach” to incorporation.
advocated variable protection between state rights protected by due
process and federal rights protected by the first eight amendments to the
Constitution. Harlan’s approach presented an interesting blend of
Cardozo-like skepticism towards criminal defendants and a progressive
understanding of due process as an evolving concept.
The blend is first exemplified by Harlan’s dissent in Malloy.
Decided in 1964, Malloy examined whether a Connecticut man’s
imprisonment for refusal to answer questions in a state gambling
309
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan
violated due process.
held that due process incorporated both the Fifth Amendment’s
privilege against self-incrimination and the applicable federal standard
310
for finding a violation. Harlan disagreed. Though the “development
of the community’s sense of justice may in time lead to expansion of the
protection which due process affords,” proper development is “shortcircuited by the simple device of incorporating into due process . . . the
whole body of law which surrounds a specific prohibition directed
311
This approach, Harlan argued,
against the Federal Government.”
inevitably disregards

308. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 (2010) (collecting Harlan
concurrences and dissents).
309. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
310. Id. This holding overruled Twining and Adamson. See id. at 6.
311. Id. at 15–16 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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all relevant differences which may exist between state and
federal criminal law and its enforcement. The ultimate result is
compelled uniformity, which is inconsistent with the purpose of
our federal system and which is achieved either by
encroachment on the States’ sovereign powers or by dilution in
federal law enforcement of the specific protections found in the
312
Bill of Rights.
Beyond attacking jot-for-jot incorporation, Harlan also opined in
Malloy that Connecticut decision comported with fundamental fairness,
and that “under any standard—state or federal—the commitment for
313
contempt was proper.”
Consider next Harlan’s dissent in Duncan. Decided in 1968, Duncan
concerned whether a young Louisiana man’s conviction for simple
assault, obtained before a judge despite a requested jury trial, violated
314
due process of law. By this time, the selective incorporation train had
gathered a full head of steam and Justice White’s majority opinion held
that due process “guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases
which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the
315
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.” Harlan dissented, noting that “I have
raised my voice many times before against the Court’s continuing
undiscriminating insistence upon fastening on the States federal notions
316
of criminal justice.” For Harlan, the Court’s incorporation approach
“put[s] the States in a constitutional straitjacket with respect to their
317
own development in the administration of criminal or civil law.” He
advocated instead a “more discriminating process of adjudication” that
318
exhibited “constitutional tolerance for state experimentation.” On the

312. Id. at 16–17 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 32 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
314. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 146–47 (1968).
315. Id. at 149. See also supra note 203 and accompanying text for discussion of the due
process standard articulated by Justice White and later embraced by Justice Alito in
McDonald.
316. Id. at 173 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Malloy, 378 U.S. at 14 (Harlan,
J., dissenting)). Harlan’s citation to his Malloy dissent here is represented as a solid arrow in
Figure 5.
317. Id. at 175–76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 176 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan actually closes his dissent with an ode to
the idea of state experimentation and quotes from Justice Brandeis’ celebrated dictum: “It is,
he said, ‘one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . . .’” Id. at 193 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (alteration
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particular jury question, Harlan argued that the “jury trial is not a
requisite of due process” because it is not “the only fair means of
319
resolving issues of fact.”
This brings us to Justice Stevens’ strange dissent in McDonald.
After thirty-five years on the Court and more than his share of
important dissents, this forty-two page opinion constituted Stevens’ final
320
As shown in Figure 5, Justice Stevens explicitly
word in dissent.
invoked Harlan’s incorporation dissents in this epic case.321 Harlan
directly supported Stevens’ argument that the Fourteenth Amendment
322
“‘stands . . . on its own bottom’” and that due process applies directly
to the States “without intermediate reliance on any of the first eight
323
Echoing Harlan, Stevens endorsed the “‘two-track
Amendments.”
324
approach’” as one promoting federalism and state experimentation.
Instead of selective incorporation, Stevens described the proper due
process test in Cardozo’s terms: whether a challenged state practice
325
Under
“violates values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”
this test, Stevens concluded that petitioners opposing the handgun
regulations ostensibly at issue had “failed to show why their asserted
in original) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)). Here we see Harlan both invoking a proud prior dissenting tradition and
attempting to tar the majority with charges of an inflexible conception of due process akin to
Lochnerism.
319. Id. at 186–87.
320. Perhaps most impressive among Justice Stevens’ many dissents is his opinion in
Bowers v. Hardwick, which was explicitly redeemed in Lawrence v. Texas. See Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down Texas sodomy law: “Justice Stevens’ analysis,
in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should control here. . . . Bowers v.
Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”).
321. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3092 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing Malloy, 378 U.S. at 24 (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 3093 n.11
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I can hardly improve upon the many passionate defenses of this
position [holding state and federal governments to different standards] that Justice Harlan
penned during his tenure on the Court.” (citation omitted)).
322. Id. at 3093 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
323. Id. at 3092 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Malloy, 378 U.S. at 24 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
324. See, e.g., id. at 3094–95 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the Court, id. at 3046, and
citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
Here Stevens cites to the same famous Brandeis dissent for the same rhetorical purposes that
Harlan did in Duncan. See supra text accompanying note 318.
325. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3096 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Following Harlan again, Stevens locates himself in
the incorporation tradition of Justice Cardozo.
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interest is intrinsic to the concept of ordered liberty or vulnerable to
326
maltreatment in the political arena.”
The reason I call Stevens’ dissent strange is that he explicitly sided
with conservative dissents in criminal procedure cases—Malloy and
Duncan—where he most certainly agreed with the liberal results
upholding strong double-jeopardy and jury-trial rights for criminal
defendants. Indeed, the greater irony is that McDonald seemingly led
Stevens to align himself with the conservative dissents of the Warren
Court while Alito and the plurality embraced the Warren Court’s liberal
327
majorities. This tension perhaps explains Stevens’ odd combination in
McDonald of both embracing Harlan’s dissents and attempting to
distinguish the Warren Court incorporation cases. He thus suggested
that selective incorporation only applied in criminal procedure cases
where the “need for certainty and uniformity is more pressing, and the
328
margin for error slimmer.” Since the Second Amendment advances a
non-procedural right, according to Stevens, its status under due process
329
should not be governed by criminal procedural principles. While this
attempt at category distinction based on substantive versus procedural
rights has natural appeal, Stevens’ argument makes no sense given that
he proposed to adopt the “basic [due process] inquiry . . . described by
330
Justice Cardozo more than 70 years ago [in Palko].” As we have seen,
Cardozo used this “basic inquiry” in Palko precisely to deny the
expansion of criminal procedure rights—just as he had done in Snyder
and just as Harlan advocated in Malloy and Duncan.
This apparent contradiction is best understood by not reading
Stevens’ dissent literally. By this I mean that though Stevens ostensibly
addressed the incorporation issues in McDonald, his clear concern was
actually with broader substantive due process doctrine. In other words,
Stevens’ dissent is best read not as a coherent argument against Second
Amendment incorporation in particular but rather as a grand lesson on
substantive due process analysis and constitutional interpretation writ
326. Id. at 3116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
327. Stevens himself apparently recognized this irony, though he understandably sought
to emphasize the plurality’s doctrinal hypocrisy rather than his own: “[I]f some 1960’s
opinions purported to establish a general method of incorporation, that hardly binds us in this
case. The Court has not hesitated to cut back on perceived Warren Court excesses in more
areas than I can count.” Id. at 3095 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 3094 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
329. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 3096 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
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large.331 On this reading, the incorporation debate is secondary, if not
entirely irrelevant, to Stevens’ parting lecture on the “conceptual core”
of substantive due process analysis, which primarily implicates questions
of “[s]elf-determination, bodily integrity, freedom of conscience,
332
intimate relationships, political equality, dignity and respect.” In this
broader arena, Stevens engages in a pitched battle with his conservative
333
colleagues and their strict textualist and originalist methodologies.
Stevens’ dissent thus constitutes a rallying cry for a competing due
334
process school that promotes the idea of a “living Constitution.”
Given this context, Stevens’ invocation of the second Justice Harlan
and the anti-incorporation school makes perfect doctrinal sense. In
McDonald, Stevens advocated for understanding due process as a
335
As far back as Hurtado, opinions in the anti“dynamic concept.”
incorporation line have emphasized that due process cannot be strictly
defined according to settled usage—to do so “would be to deny every
quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or
improvement. It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the
336
unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians.”
331. From the start, Stevens announces, “This is a substantive due process case.” Id. at
3090 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He then argues why the Due Process Clause applies to matters
of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. Id. at 3090–91. From here, he argues
that “selective incorporation” is a “subset” of substantive due process doctrine. Id. at 3093
(internal quotation marks omitted).
After defending the “two-track” approach to
incorporation, id. at 3093–95, Stevens then expounds his theory of substantive due process
interpretation. Id. at 3096–103. Stevens’ dissent spans over fourteen pages before devoting
any sustained attention to the Second Amendment issue.
332. Id. at 3101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
333. Stevens only briefly skirmishes with Justice Thomas when he describes Thomas’
campaign for radical change in privileges and immunities doctrine as animated by a desire to
displace major portions of the Court’s equal protection and substantive due process
jurisprudence. Id. at 3089 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,
528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). The conflict with Justice Scalia, by contrast, is epic.
Scalia wrote a separate concurrence specifically to counter Stevens’ “broad condemnation of
the theory of interpretation which underlies the Court’s opinion, a theory that makes the
traditions of our people paramount.” See id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring). The back and
forth between Scalia and Stevens defines the current state of the competing due process
schools.
334. See id. at 3057 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(describing Stevens as a “living Constitution” advocate).
335. Id. at 3099 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 13, 38
(1992)).
336. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529; see also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78, 100 (1908) (“This court has always declined to give a comprehensive definition of [due
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Stevens taps this traditional vein in his dissent and constructs a broader
critique of a “wholly backward looking” or “rigid historical” approach
to substantive due process that he argues characterizes the McDonald
337
While previous stalwarts in the antiplurality’s approach.
incorporation school used the idea of dynamism to oppose criminal
procedure rights, Stevens used his dissent as a pulpit to preach a new
direction for the old school.
In his attempt to influence future doctrine, Stevens’ final dissent falls
in line with the tradition of great due process dissents examined in this
Article. The proposition that a sophisticated understanding of Stevens’
dissent requires reading context more than text falls in line with the
argument presented that doctrine unfolds through a dialectic that
338
cannot be captured by citation alone. Figure 6 below illustrates the
specific picture of the doctrinal push and pull between competing
schools in the incorporation genealogy. Note that rival doctrinal lines
cross three times. First, the anti-incorporation lines from Snyder to
Twining and Hurtado cross the pro-incorporation school’s early line of
majority presence connecting Powell to Chicago Burlington & Quincy.
Second, as the strong incorporation school falls back into dissent, the
line from Black’s Betts dissent back to Powell crosses the antiincorporation school central axis between Snyder and Palko. Finally,
the incorporation school’s eventual victory in Gideon creates two
crossings. In majority territory, the Gideon–Powell line cuts across the
Snyder–Palko axis. In the realm of dissent, the hermeneutic link
between Black’s Gideon majority and his own Adamson dissent crosses
the line from Harlan’s dissent in Malloy back to the deposed king,
Palko.
Once again, it must be stressed that the doctrinal map here
339
Yet the picture here is still
simplifies the territory represented.
complex and the multiple crossed lines suggest that incorporation
doctrine evolved through a dialectic exchange between competing due

process], and has preferred that its full meaning should be gradually ascertained by the
process of inclusion and exclusion . . . .”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176–77 (1968)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 529).
337. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3097–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
338. See infra App., at p.1328.
339. See, e.g., supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing omitted First
Amendment cases), note 213 and accompanying text (discussing omission of Mapp v. Ohio
and Wolf v. Colorado), and note 231 and accompanying text (discussing omission of Brennan
opinions in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price and Cohen v. Hurley).

16 - STARGER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

7/9/2012 10:10 PM

EXILE ON MAIN STREET

1321

process traditions. Those rival traditions themselves mutated over time
as they encountered new arguments and reacted to new teachings and
opinions. Dissents played an integral role in this complex evolution.
Besides challenging majority reasoning and sowing seeds for future
overruling, dissents also pushed exiled traditions in new directions.
Though not always cited, dissents more than held up their end of the
constitutional conversation.
V. CONCLUSION: DISSENT AND DUE PROCESS BORDERS
John Hart Ely once famously observed that “‘substantive due
process’ is a contradiction in terms—sort of like ‘green pastel
340
redness.’” Ely’s quip took, and it is now a commonplace to call SDP
341
an oxymoron. Yet this SDP snub was never more than a clever play
on words. As noted earlier, “due process of law” is a phrase translated
342
from Latin in the Magna Carta. The more literal translation of “per
legem terræ” in the Magna Carta is “by the law of the land.”343 The
substantive “law of the land” is hardly an oxymoron. Neither is the
procedural “law of the land” a redundancy. Despite the underlying
emptiness of Ely’s enduring joke, it is certainly true that neither the
phrase “substantive due process” nor the phrase “procedural due
process” (PDP) appear in the Constitution. This then raises the
question: where did SDP and PDP come from?
It should come as no surprise that the answer to this question is—
dissents! As it turns out, the exact phrase “procedural due process” first
entered the Supreme Court lexicon in a dissent from the incorporation
344
line, specifically Justice Owen Robert’s dissent in 1934’s Snyder.
Recall that Snyder concerned whether a criminal defendant had a due
process right to confront witnesses against him like that guaranteed by

340. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
18 (1980).
341. See, e.g., Mays v. City of East St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 1997) (opinion
of Easterbrook, J.) (calling SDP an “oxymoron”); Ill. Psychol. Ass’n v. Falk, 818 F.2d 1337,
1342 (7th Cir. 1987) (opinion of Posner, J.) (calling SDP a “durable oxymoron”).
342. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
344. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137 (1937) (Roberts, J., dissenting). The
proposition that this is the first use of the phrase “procedural due process” is confirmed
through searching for that precise phrase on Westlaw or Lexis in the Supreme Court
database. Snyder is the earliest case retrieved where the phrase is used in the actual text of
the opinion (not the Keycite or Headnote text).
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the Sixth Amendment. Cardozo held that due process did not imply
such a right. Roberts objected:
A distinction has always been observed in the meaning of due
process as affecting property rights, and as applying to procedure
in the courts. In the former aspect the requirement is satisfied if
no actual injury is inflicted and the substantial rights of the
citizen are not infringed; the result rather than the means of
reaching it is the important consideration. But where the
conduct of a trial is involved, the guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment is not that a just result shall have been obtained,
but that the result, whatever it be, shall be reached in a fair way.
Procedural due process has to do with the manner of the trial;
dictates that in the conduct of judicial inquiry certain
fundamental rules of fairness be observed; forbids the disregard
of those rules, and is not satisfied, though the result is just, if the
345
hearing was unfair.
According to Roberts, the practice at issue in Snyder precisely violated
this procedural due process.346 It is important to recognize that in this
first reference to PDP, Roberts uses the phrase to argue for importing
the right to confront witnesses through the Due Process Clause. Today
this would be thought of as an argument for SDP incorporation.
However, for Roberts, the key distinction is that between conduct-oftrial due process and “due process affecting property rights.” In
essence, Roberts is trying to distinguish the procedural protections
found in the Sixth Amendment from the substantive protections for
rights found in cases like Lochner and its progeny.
Snyder was decided three years before West Coast Hotel ended
Lochner’s reign. The Court-packing crisis was not yet on the horizon
and Roberts had yet to be cast as the “switch in time that saved nine.”
But already we see the germs of a strategy for using Lochner as a foil
when defining “good” due process from “bad.” This strategy later
flowered in the dissenting opinion of Justice Wiley Rutledge in 1948’s
Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, which marked the first time the
phrase “substantive due process” was used in the text of a Court
347
opinion.
345. Id. (emphasis added).
346. Id. at 138.
347. See Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (1948) (Rutledge, J.,
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Republic Natural Gas concerned an appeal from an Oklahoma State
Commission ordering Republic to pay money to another natural gas
348
Republic argued it
company for draining gas from a common pool.
had a property right, protected by due process, to drain the gas.349 The
Court majority, per Justice Frankfurter, held that there was no final
350
In
judgment and dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.
dissent, Justice Rutledge argued that the merits were properly before
the Court and that Republic actually had no protectable property
351
Rutledge denied that Republic had any right protected by
interest.
“substantive due process” and observed that the Fourteenth
Amendment “was not a strait jacket immobilizing state power to change
352
or alter institutions of property in the public interest.” To support this
proposition, Rutledge stated that previous cases that had given the
Amendment expansive property protections “have failed to withstand
the test of time” and specifically cited Lochner, Adkins, and then West
353
By associating “substantive due process” with a
Coast Hotel.
renounced line of cases, Rutledge sought to divide due process into
legitimate and illegitimate territories.
Rutledge’s categorization highlights another important role dissents
play in doctrinal development. Beyond influencing the internal shape of
SDP doctrines like economic liberty or incorporation, dissents also help
construct external borders between rival due process territories.
Dissents have introduced vocabulary and lines of argument that have
distinguished PDP from SDP. In McDonald, we observed Justice
Stevens’ dissent contest the border between incorporation and other
SDP doctrines. Drawing lines between doctrines potentially limits the
applicable scope of legal rules laid down by the majority. This is simply
another way that dissents offer rival interpretations of constitutional
traditions and create a context in which majority text is read. Whether
dissenting). As with “procedural due process,” the proposition that Republic Natural Gas
produced the first use of the phrase “substantive due process” is confirmed through a
Westlaw or Lexis search on “substantive due process” in the Supreme Court database.
Republic Natural Gas is the earliest case retrieved where the phrase is used in the actual text
of the opinion (not the Keycite or Headnote text).
348. Id. at 63–67.
349. Id. at 67.
350. Id. at 72.
351. Id. at 87–93 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
352. Id. at 90 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
353. Id. at 90 & n.23 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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contested lines are between doctrines or within them, dissents advance
the conversation about how best to draw them. It is this complex and
ever-evolving line-drawing conversation that ultimately gives shape to
doctrine.
In this Article, I have looked at the lines drawn by and through
dissents in the economic liberty and incorporation territories of SDP
doctrine. As I have shown, drawing these lines cannot depend solely on
the citations contained within opinion texts. Dissents form doctrinal
context, which is missed by an overly narrow reading of authority. I
have suggested a hermeneutic technique that allows links to be made
between opinions when citation is not available. This technique
proceeds by dividing an area of doctrine into competing schools of
thought and then constructing an opinion genealogy for each rival
school. These rival genealogies may be mapped—and maps give visual
representation to the shape of doctrine.
The technique was implemented to map economic liberty and
incorporation doctrine. Analysis of the genealogies of these competing
schools confirmed that dissents played a vital role in the evolution of
SDP bloodlines. Without Bradley’s dissent in Slaughter-House, the SDP
economic liberty school might never have risen. Without Holmes’
Lochner dissent, the economic liberty line might not have fallen so
quickly or so hard. Similarly, incorporation could not have become a
SDP doctrine without the efforts of Harlan (I) and his dissent in
Hurtado, which initiated a tradition later rescued from exile by Justice
Black after the redemption of his Adamson dissent. The insight about
the role of dissents in shaping the direction of schools of due process
thoughts invites us to read Justice Stevens’ final dissent in McDonald
not as a vigorous assault on incorporation, but rather as an attempt to
shape the future of SDP doctrine more broadly conceived.
In the end, I hope that the maps and genealogies presented have
usefully complicated the foundational concept of tradition that lies at
the heart of due process analysis. The constant contest and debate over
the existence and proper interpretation of our inherited customs and
modes of legal proceeding demonstrate that no single doctrinal school
can legitimately claim all of constitutional tradition. The traditions and
conscience of our society are not monolithic. Whether conceived of as a
living thing or strictly grounded in history, debates over the true
meaning of tradition are inevitable in constitutional law. And in this
inevitable debate, due process dissents will always play a vital role in
shaping the contours, vocabulary, and direction of argument.
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